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This thesis examines the developing capabilities of the Indian surface
combatant force. The emergence of a powerful Indian Navy is of interest to
the United States in view of the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean
region and its potentially related effects on Western Pacific maritime security.
This study examines the history, current and future capabilities of, and the
political and industrial support for the Indian surface combatant fleet.
Current and future Indian naval strategy is examined and intelligence
indicators are presented to assist in determining the intent behind India's
naval expansion. Finally, the implications of a capable Indian surface force
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Indian Ocean is of vital strategic importance to the United States.. 28
percent of U.S. oil imports traverse regional SLOCs, as do significantly larger
percentages of the imports of allies, with whom the U.S. is economically
interdependent. The development of U.S regional bases, establishment of the
RDJTF and DESERT STORM operations, and continuing NCA-mandated
forward presence of U.S. military forces, primarily naval forces, are all
indicative of the strategic significance of the Indian Ocean region for the U.S.
The expansion of the Indian Navy in general, and surface force in
particular, should be viewed with interest by the U.S. government. The
Indian surface fleet has evolved from a coastal defense force to a blue-water
fleet with developing power projection capabilities. India's naval victories in
the 1971 war with Pakistan demonstrated to the Indian leadership the utility
of naval forces in an offensive role. Well-funded national policies based on
these perceptions have resulted in a steady improvement in the quantity and
quality of the Indian surface fleet over the past 20 years.
The Indian surface fleet, currently centered around two V/STOL aircraft
carriers, enjoys continued national political backing and is supported by a
robust industrial infrastructure. Shipyards, national industry and an
extensive R&D establishment provide a strong technical base for the
development and deployment of naval systems. This industrial support has
resulted in a steady increase in the number of indigenous systems fielded by
the Indian Navy. Although still reliant to a large degree on foreign sources
for naval weaponry, the Indian surface fleet is steadily growing more self-
sufficient in all other areas of naval procurement.
The Indian surface fleet is already significantly more capable than other
regional navies. Increased numbers of combatants, carrier strike capabilities
and strategic base locations allow the Indian surface fleet to exercise a growing
degree of local sea control in waters adjacent to India. The Indian surface
force remains vulnerable to air attack (primarily from a regional land-based
threat), and currently lacks significant amphibious and logistics capability.
However, programs are in progress to rectify these shortcomings.
Current Indian naval strategy emphasizes EEZ protection, monitoring of
extra-regional navies, sea control in specified areas, and limited power
projection . These areas will continue to be emphasized, but there are many
indications that future Indian naval strategy will be more proactive and
offensive in orientation, with the surface fleet playing a major role.
The regional reaction to India's naval expansion has been one of alarm
and trepidation. Several regional nations have begun their own naval
development programs in response and there exists a credible danger that a
regional arms race could result. Continued U.S. presence is seen as both
reassuring and desirable to avert creation of a power vacuum that India
might try to fill. While the Indian fleet has moderate capabilities compared to
those of the U.S. it could have significant utility in a regional allied role. A
regional naval security arrangement involving the U.S. and India, as well as
other regional nations, could help achieve mutual aims for ensuring the
stability and security of the region. If that role is properly balanced with
related policy concerns in the Western Pacific, the U.S. could even be in a
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position to promote stability between India and China—a development that
would be beneficial to all concerned parties.
The breakup of the Soviet Union has changed the power relationships in
many parts of the world, including the Indian Ocean region. Diplomatic
initiatives, which acknowledge India's emerging dominant regional position,
could allow the U.S. to develop new security relationships to promote
stability in this increasingly volatile stage of world events.
The nature of future Indian national and naval strategy is difficult to
discern given the lack of an official articulation of India's regional goals. This
thesis offers intelligence indicators to assist in the determination of whether
Indian naval strategy is likely to be offensive or defensive in nature. With no
official naval strategy by which to gauge India's regional aspirations,
observers are compelled to assess India's naval intentions on the basis of
rhetoric (which has been predominantly inflammatory in nature), its growing
naval capabilities, and in particular, naval actions. Based upon these factors,




"The Indian Ocean is the key to the seven seas. In the 21st century, the
destiny of the world will be decided on its waters."
ADM Alfred T. Mahan, USN (Hahn, 1990, p. 9)
The Indian surface combatant fleet will continue to develop into a
modern force capable of projecting maritime power in the Indian Ocean
region and could have an impact on U.S. interests in the region. For
centuries the Indian Ocean has served as a mercantile highway, facilitating
commerce between East and West. As civilization has advanced, the
percentage of the world's maritime trade that utilizes the Indian Ocean's 28
million square miles has steadily increased. Today, one quarter of the global
maritime trade crosses the Indian ocean (Singh, 1987, p. 159). The Indian
Ocean region (see Figure 1) is rich in strategic raw materials, including energy
resources such as uranium, gas, and oil, as well as significant manganese,
copper, nickel, cobalt, and molybdenum deposits. Several major sea lines of
communication (SLOCs) between Europe, the Middle East, South Asia,
Oceania, and the Far East pass through the Indian Ocean (Hahn, 1990, p. 9).
The primary regional strategic interests of the U.S. are the uninterrupted flow
of Persian Gulf oil (which represents 28% of U.S. petroleum imports and
significantly larger percentages of imports of allies such as Germany and
Japan), and a secure maritime commerce environment for the U.S. and allies
with whom the U.S. is economically interdependent (Department of Energy,
1991). The development of the U.S. base at Diego Garcia, the establishment of
the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) to respond to regional crises,
and the recent DESERT SHIELD/STORM operations are indicative of the
strategic significance of the Indian Ocean region to the U.S.
Figure 1. Indian Ocean Region
Source: (Awati, 1990, p. 23)
India occupies a unique and strategically dominant position, physically
and economically, in the Indian Ocean. The major SLOCs and 50 percent of
the Indian Ocean are within 900 miles of India's 3000 mile coastline (Tellis,
Autumn 1990, p. 43). India surpasses the other South Asian nations
collectively in population, size, GNP, scientific and technological capabilities,
and industrial capacity (Subrahmanyam, 1984, p. 163). This geographic
position and national potential make India a key power in a region where
stability and security are of great importance to regional and extra-regional
nations alike.
For much of the period since gaining independence in 1947, India has
focused primarily on its land borders, and defense policy has been oriented to
deal with perceived land-based threats from China and Pakistan (Rais, 1990,
p. 39). In recent years, however, India has embarked on an ambitious naval
development program and has demonstrated a renewed commitment to
becoming a significant, if not dominant, regional naval power. Former Prime
Minister Nehru explained India's naval views when he stated "We have
once again realized the importance of the sea and, therefore the importance of
the Navy. We cannot afford to be weak at sea.. .to be secure on land, we must
be supreme at sea" (Hahn, 1990, p. 10).
India's naval expansion has led to concern by many littoral nations in the
area as to the purpose of an Indian naval force far superior in numbers and
capability than many believe are required for strictly defensive missions. As a
superpower that considers the security of the Indian Ocean one of its vital
national interests, the United States should also be concerned with the
emergence of a strong Indian navy and examine the possible consequences
that enhanced Indian naval capabilities may have for near and long-term
regional security and stability.
B. PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an unclassified intelligence
assessment of the most visible and dramatically improved component of the
Indian navy, the surface combatant force. The current and projected
capabilities of the Indian surface force, trends in Indian ship design and
development, and the role of the surface fleet in Indian naval strategy are
examined to determine indicators which may point to India's ultimate
maritime goals in the Indian Ocean region. This thesis also examines the
implications that the development of the Indian surface force and its power
projection capabilities may have for U.S. naval policy in the region and the
potential that this force possesses to affect U.S. security interests in the Indian
Ocean.
C ORGANIZATION
Chapter II of this thesis reviews the Indian Navy's development from
1947 to the present. The structure and role of the surface force in India's four
wars and various regional interventions is examined to determine how these
factors have evolved over the past four decades. Trends in ship design and
weapons capabilities also are addressed to determine what direction the
surface force is likely to follow for the future.
Chapter III addresses the current and projected capabilities of the Indian
surface force. The major surface combatants (carriers, destroyers, frigates, and
corvettes) along with amphibious and logistic support vessels are examined.
Chapter IV examines the industrial support for the development of
India's surface force, including shipyards, national industries, and research
and development (R&D) to determine the degree to which the Indian public
and private sectors are committed to continuing and expanding naval
modernization and development.
Chapter V assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the force relative to
potential regional adversaries. This assessment is based on unclassified
material, knowledge acquired by the author during study in the Technical
Intelligence curriculum, and the author's six years of experience as a Surface
Warfare officer. An assumption of this study is that the myriad of regional
small combatants (missile boats, patrol boats, etc.), although possessing a
significant coastal defense capability, do not, unless forward-based, possess the
range and endurance for extended offensive power-projection operations and
therefore will not be addressed in depth.
Chapter VI discusses current and projected Indian naval strategy and the
role of the surface force in this strategy. The influence of the Indian political
process is discussed and intelligence indicators are presented to aid in
determining whether India's future naval policy is likely to be offensive or
defensive in nature.
Chapter VII addresses regional reactions to India's naval expansion, the
implications of this expansion for the U.S. and recommendations for U.S.
regional policy.
D. METHODOLOGY
This thesis evaluates the Indian surface force as a component of the "sea
force" aspect of Indian maritime power. The other components (i.e.,
submarine force, land-based air) are not specifically addressed in this study.
Technical evaluation of present and future force developments is based on
design trends and on content analysis of Indian government and naval
literature. The potential effectiveness of the Indian surface force is evaluated
in terms of the model for medium naval powers as developed by RADM J.R.
Hill in Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers. The surface fleet capability is
assessed in the following areas:
• Normal conditions
• Low intensity operations
• Higher level operations
The source material for this thesis is from open literature, as well as from
interviews with defense analysts and authors. Primary Indian sources are
utilized wherever possible.
II. INDIAN SURFACE FORCE DEVELOPMENT
A. EARLY DEVELOPMENT
Over the last four decades the Indian Navy, currently one of the largest
and most capable navies in the world, has progressed from a mediocre coastal
defense organization to a modern offensively capable "blue-water" force. The
present Indian Navy traces its roots to the Royal Indian Navy. The Royal
Indian Navy was subordinated to the British Royal Navy prior to Indian
independence and played only a minor role during the Second World War.
Consequently, the Indian Navy, which officially came into existence in 1950,
inherited little combat experience and naval tradition from its predecessor.
The Indian Navy did, during the first two decades of its existence, possess a
distinctive Royal Navy character. Many Indian officers had been trained in
the United Kingdom and had served under British command during the
Second World War. Most of the senior leadership were graduates of Royal
Navy staff colleges. Additionally, many of the enlisted personnel had
received varying degrees of Royal Navy training (Larus, 1981, p. 78). The
initial surface force acquisitions of the Indian Navy were several aging British
cruisers and destroyers, with additional frigates being added throughout the
1950s. The marginal capabilities of these ships (at best limited coastal
defense), combined with the lack of a significant maritime threat, resulted in
a naval force that had little reason for existence, let alone expansion. No
significant mission was articulated for the Indian Navy except that a token
naval presence was desirable for the sake of national pride (Thomas, 1986, p.
152).
The years between 1947 and 1965 were marked by neglect for the Indian
Navy. Many government officials saw no justification for a navy and felt that
appropriations to that end were a luxury that could not be afforded. Another
factor that stunted the early growth of the navy was the fact that India's early
conflicts (Indo-Pakistani War of 1947, Sino-Indian War of 1962, and Indo-
Pakistani War of 1965) were primarily land and air battles with no role played
by the Indian navy. As a result the navy consistently received lowest priority
in defense appropriations and lacked the prestige of its sister services (Larus,
1981, p. 78). The only development of note was the acquisition in 1961 from
Britain of the light carrier INS Vikrant (ex-HMS Hercules). The Vikrant was
purchased with sterling assets left in India by the Royal Navy for the specific
purpose of acquiring naval assets from Britain and was not the result of any
real appreciation of the need for a powerful navy (Tellis, 13 August 1991).
With few assets available to escort the new carrier, the Indian Navy remained
an essentially defensive force and the halt on funding that resulted from the
1962 Sino-Indian War prevented any further expansion (Singh, 1987, p. 6).
The Indian Navy took its first steps towards modernization following the
1965 war with Pakistan. During that conflict the Indian fleet was caught
unprepared and lacked the doctrine and capabilities (as a result of the low
funding levels) to interdict Pakistani warships. Consequently, a Pakistani
surface group raided several Indian ports and installations virtually
unchallenged (Tellis, Part I 1990, p. 84). Although the war was decided on the
land, this perceived poor performance by the Indian Navy resulted in a
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directive from the Indian Ministry of Defence to the Naval Chief of Staff to
begin procuring new and modern ships. Britain, the heretofore traditional
source of Indian naval procurement, authorized the licensed production in
India of Leander class frigates. This had been preceded, however, by several
Western rejections to Indian overtures regarding naval procurement
(Thakur, 1990, p. 9). These rejections were primarily the result of a Western
arms embargo imposed on the Indian sub-continent after the 1965 war
(Thomas, 1989, p. 190). Indian naval planners, as a result, had begun to look
elsewhere for naval acquisitions. Due to India's political shift towards
Moscow, the Soviet Union was approached and a naval assistance agreement
was signed in 1965. As a result, during the period 1965-77, India became the
primary beneficiary of Soviet naval exports. The surface fleet benefited
immediately with the acquisition of Petya II class frigates and assorted missile
boats that provided a significant increase in capability (Larus, 1981, p. 78-79).
Soviet assistance was also provided in the development of a new shipyard at
Vishakhapatnam on India's eastern coast. The structure of the fleet
underwent significant change during this period. In 1966 the naval
leadership laid plans for the development of a modern two-fleet navy. These
plans were manifested in 1968 with the formation of the Western Fleet (based
at Bombay) and the Eastern Fleet (based at Vishakhapatnam). The naval
leadership launched a program intending naval forces to be procured from
overseas initially with indigenous construction to be expanded to supplement
and eventually replace foreign acquisitions (Singh, 1987, p. 7). To support the
developing fleet, maintenance and construction capabilities were significantly
improved by expanding and modernizing the shipyards at Bombay and
Calcutta, the major Ministry of Defence shipbuilding facilities (Thomas, 1976,
p. 502). By 1971 the Indian surface fleet had become more balanced and




• 3 destroyer escorts
• 16 frigates (with 3 Leander class under construction)
• 6 Osa I class missile boats
• 4 amphibious vessels
The Indian Navy, however, was still of lesser status than the Indian
Army and Air Force and had yet to prove itself in battle. That opportunity
finally came in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War.
The Indian Navy in general, and the surface force in particular, enjoyed a
great deal of success during the 1971 war. The missions assigned to the two
fleets consisted of:
• Destruction of Pakistani maritime forces
• Disruption of Pakistani trade and protection of Indian trade
• Strikes against Pakistani military shore targets
• Blockade of East Pakistan (Kaul, 1973, p. 188)
To varying degrees, all of these missions were accomplished. Indian
naval aviation made its combat debut as air strikes from Vikrant were
directed at the ports of Chittagong and Cox's Bazar in East Pakistan (now
Bangladesh), inflicting damage on Pakistani gunboats, merchant vessels, and
oil storage facilities. The naval blockade of East Pakistan which was imposed
by the Vikrant battle group and additional surface forces successfully
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prevented the evacuation of Pakistani forces. The surface force also played an
offensive role in the Arabian Sea, as a group of Petya II class frigates and Osa I
class missile boats executed a bold missile strike (the frigates towed the missile
boats to within striking range) at the port of Karachi in West Pakistan.
Several oil storage tanks and Pakistani warships were destroyed or damaged
(Kaul, 1973, p. 189-92). As a result of these actions, the Pakistani surface fleet
remained in port and played no significant role in the conflict. At the war's
conclusion, Pakistan had lost six warships (33% of total force) and 43
merchant vessels had been sunk or captured. The Indian Navy lost only one
destroyer (INS Khukri was sunk by a Pakistani submarine) during the conflict
(Sojka, 1983, p. 8).
The 1971 war marked a major turning point for the Indian Navy.
Although the naval war had been conducted against a numerically inferior
adversary and Pakistani air power had been neutralized rapidly by the Indian
Air Force (more through good fortune than coordinated planning), allowing
the Indian Navy to operate virtually unopposed, the naval victory greatly
boosted the confidence and image of the navy. The Indian Navy had vividly
illustrated the value of pursuing an aggressive naval strategy and
demonstrated that it had a significant role in national defense (Tellis, Part I
1990, p. 85). The navy also learned negative lessons from the conflict. The
sole amphibious operation attempted was a total failure. The operation (an
attempt to land near Cox's Bazar) was unopposed but hurriedly conceived
and was attempted on a beach that was unsuitable for an amphibious landing
(Kaul, 1973, p. 189). Additionally, India's weakness in relation to foreign
powers was demonstrated by the "gunboat diplomacy" of the aircraft carrier
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17SS Enterprise, which entered the Bay of Bengal during the conflict. The
perceived threat of this deployment angered the Indian government and gave
added validity to the desire of the navy for additional modern warships
(Conboy, 1988, p. 1). With the exception of these latter events, the 1971 war
was clearly the Indian Navy's finest hour and marked the starting point for a
period of dramatic naval expansion and modernization. As stated by
Commodore Ranjit Rais, IN (ret.), the early 1970s was "...a time when Indian
naval professionalism evolved an identity of its own..." (Sassheen, 1988 p.
112)
B. FORCE DEVELOPMENT (1972-91)
1. Budgetary Trends
For all of its existence the Indian Navy has ranked a distant third in
funding priority behind the Army and Air Force. Nevertheless, the funding
levels for the Navy as a percentage of the defense budget has steadily
increased since the mid-1960s (see TABLE I).
TABLE I. INDIAN NAVAL BUDGET AS % OF DEFENSE BUDGET
YEAR 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1990
% 7.9 4.2 7.0 9.0 11.0 12.5 13.5
Source: Indian Defence Review 1988 & Government of India Ministry of
Defence Annual Report 1988-89
Of additional significance are the increases in the navy's capital share of the
defense budget. This had increased from 8% in 1970 to 52% by 1977 and
remained at approximately that level through the 1980s (Thomas, 1986,
p. 191). In terms of capital allocation, the Indian Navy and Air Force, both
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capital intensive services, apparently reversed the positions occupied in the
1960s—an indication that the necessity for a capable naval force had become
apparent to the political leadership (Thomas, 1976, p. 503). Although the
percentage of the defense budget and capital allocations have remained
roughly steady during the past two years as a result of national fiscal
problems, the Indian government appears committed to maintaining an
effective naval force. Indicative of this view is the April 1990 statement of
then Prime Minister Singh, who asserted that allocations would continue to
be made for the growth and modernization of the Indian Navy despite
financial problems (Singh, 1990, p. 34). Public statements of this nature,
expressing support for naval growth, have been made by each of India's
leaders since the early 1960s and have been supplemented by real-term
funding increases over the past 20 years.
2. Surface Combatant Development
The major surface combatant development during the 1970s was the
addition to the fleet of the Leander class frigates. These capable ASW vessels
were the first major warships to be built in Indian shipyards and have a 60%
indigenous component. The Leander class were the first examples of the
Indian proclivity for combining systems from many nations in a single hull.
These vessels, for example, feature Soviet SSMs, Canadian sonars, British
SAM systems, and multinational radar systems. These ships were the Indian
Navy's first real exposure to modern, capable warships (Sharpe, 1990, p. 267).
During the 1970s the Indian Navy continued to add additional Soviet vessels
to its inventory. Specifically, four additional Petya II class frigates were
delivered from 1972-74 (bringing the total to six) and three Nanuchka II class
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corvettes were procured from 1976-78 (Sharpe, 1990, p. 269). Although these
vessels were several years old at the time of purchase they did provide an
improvement in capability for the navy.
The Indian Navy's preference for Soviet ships (which provided a
modern capability at a relatively inexpensive price) was clearly demonstrated
in the 1980s, a decade of remarkable expansion and growth for India. The
introduction in 1980 of the first of five Kashin II class destroyers greatly
enhanced the offensive potential of the navy. These ships became and
remain the nucleus of India's surface combatant force. The Indian Navy also
added two Soviet Pauk II class corvettes (with three additional units expected)
in 1989-90 and five Tarantul I class corvettes during the period of 1987-90
(seven additional Tarantuls are on order with as many as 24 units total
planned) (Sharpe, 1990, p. 268-69).
The most dramatic aspect of surface combatant development in the
1980s was that of Indian indigenous warship production. The Indian naval
leadership desired to improve India's warship design and construction
capabilities in order to gradually reduce reliance on foreign sources. The first
major program was the construction of the three Godavari class frigates
during the period 1983-85. These vessels were a modification of the Leander
design and consisted of 72% indigenous content. This class is considered to be
so successful that it is to serve as the basis for three follow-on frigates (Project
16A) planned to be in service beginning in 1994 (Sharpe, 1990, p. 266).
Additional indigenous construction capability was displayed in the
development of the Khukri class corvettes. These vessels (two commissioned
with four building) are designed as replacements for the aging Petya II class
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frigates. The indigenous content of the Khukri class is approximately 65%
and, like the Godavari class, this class will serve as the basis for follow-on
construction (Sharpe, 1990, p. 269). As of 1991, the Indian major surface
combatant force consists of 55% Soviet, 26% British, and 18% Indian vessels.
As older ships are retired, the percentage of the fleet that is of Indian
construction will increase substantially. The Indian fleet is getting younger as
well as more capable with the average age of Indian surface combatants
having decreased from 17 years in 1974 to 11 years in 1990. Additionally, the
combat tonnage of the surface combatant force is second only to China when
compared with regional navies (see Table II). A list of the surface combatants
is included in Appendix A.
TABLE II. REGIONAL SURFACE COMBATANT TONNAGE
YEAR INDIA PAKISTAN CHINA AUSTRALIA INDONESIA
1974 88513 23186 47660 60850 20670
1978 89119 27886 61260 57250 17200
1982 93622 38756 93340 64732 15190
1986 86982 30561 133510 42066 29012
1990 122742 60440 123200 43202 33512
Source: Jane's Fighting Ships (1974-1990)
3. Naval Aviation Development
The capabilities of Indian carrier aviation have increased
substantially in the period since the 1971 war. The employment of carrier
aviation in the 1971 conflict, combined with observations of the effectiveness
of carrier aviation in the Second World War and the Falklands, convinced
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the naval leadership that a surface fleet centered around the aircraft carrier
was the force structure of choice. This sentiment has continued to be echoed
in the Indian naval literature to the present (Prakash, 1990, p. 63 ). The first
notable event was the replacement of the older aircraft of Vikrant's air wing
with the British Aerospace Sea Harrier VTOL fighter. The first of these
aircraft were accepted by the navy in 1983 (Tellis, 1989, p. 141). The Sea
Harriers represent a major advance in the Indian Navy's capability for both
fleet air defense and maritime strike. The second major event was the
acquisition of INS Viraat (ex-HMS Hermes) in 1987 after an extensive refit.
The Viraat has the capacity for eight more Sea Harriers than Vikrant and
replaced the Vikrant as flagship of the fleet. The presence of a second carrier
has considerably improved the tactical flexibility and strike capability of the
Indian Navy. According to Indian naval sources, in 1987 the Indian Chief of
Naval Staff stated that the addition of Viraat to the fleet marked "the
beginning of a true blue water capability" for the Indian Navy (Singh, 1991, p.
43). Acquisition of an additional carrier to replace the aging Vikrant is
currently being considered by the Indian government. While details of the
design are unavailable in the open press, a French design firm is working
with India to develop plans for a carrier similar in size to the Charles de
Gaulle class carrier being built for the French Navy (Sharpe, 1990, p. 264).
Additionally, the Soviet Union recently announced its intention to offer the
supersonic YAK-141 V/STOL aircraft to India as a potential replacement for
the Sea Harriers as they age (Cook, 1991, p. 1164). The impressive
performance of the YAK-141 reported in the press indicates that this aircraft
could greatly surpass the Sea Harrier in terms of performance and payload
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and would give the Indian Navy an enhanced carrier strike capability (Barrie,
1991, p. 42-3). The Indian Navy is also evaluating a naval variant of the MIG-
29 and of the developing Indian Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) as possible Sea
Harrier replacements (Tellis, Part II 1990, p. 37). The almost universal
advocacy in Indian literature for maintaining a fleet aviation capability
indicates that the Indian Navy will continue to field a surface combatant force
centered around carriers for the immediate foreseeable future.
The other major improvement in Indian shipborne aviation has
occurred with the expansion of naval helicopter capabilities. Beginning with
the acquisition of the Westland Sea King Mk 42 ASW helicopter in 1970, the
Indian Navy has considered helicopters as an integral part of the carrier
airwing and an essential capability to be included in surface combatants.
Naval helicopters of British, Soviet, French and Indian design are currently
active in the Indian fleet. The Kashin II, Godavari, Leander, Whitby, and
Khukri classes are all helicopter-capable. Indicative of the importance placed
by the Indian Navy on helicopter capabilities is the fact that the percentage of
helicopter-capable ships in the inventory has risen from 10% in 1974 to
almost 50% in 1991. The current Indian development of the Advanced
Lightweight Helicopter (ALH) indicates that shipborne helicopters will
continue to be an integral part of the Indian Navy (Sharpe, 1990, p. 269). A
summary of Indian shipborne aviation assets is provided in Appendix B.
4. Amphibious Force Development
Although the development of the amphibious forces has not been as
spectacular as that of the surface combatant and naval aviation forces, the
Indian Navy has steadily improved its amphibious lift capabilities during the
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past 20 years. During the period 1975-76, the navy acquired four Polnochny C
class LSMs from Poland. Construction of seven Vasco de Gama class LCUs
began in 1978 with the last unit being delivered in 1987. In the mid-1980s, the
Indian Navy took delivery of four Polnochny D class LSMs from Poland and
commissioned the first Magar class LST (loosely based on the British Sir
Lancelot design) the largest ship constructed in India. While the current
amphibious force of 16 landing craft does not constitute an overwhelming
capability, it does reflect a significant improvement over the few such craft
available in the 1971 war (Sharpe, 1990, p. 271-72).
The Indian Navy's amphibious forces have enjoyed little operational
experience since the 1971 war. The lack of naval gunfire support and regional
geography have combined to make the employment of these forces
impractical in anything but peacekeeping roles. The interventions in Sri
Lanka and the Maldives were accomplished with the Indian Army providing
the manpower and the Indian Air Force providing the airlift (Tellis, 1991).
There was no real opportunity for the Indian surface fleet to play a significant
role, although, during the Maldives intervention, the Godavari intercepted
and boarded the merchant ship that was escaping with the mercenaries who
had initiated a coup attempt (Prakash, 1988, p. 49). The small (1000 man)
marine brigade is trained primarily for installation protection, not
amphibious assault. Additionally, the Indian Army provides most of the
amphibious troops to the Navy a situation that makes training and
coordination difficult. If India is to have the capability to protect its many
territorial islands (an oft-stated naval objective), an expanded and trained
amphibious force will be necessary (Tellis, Part II 1990, p. 41).
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5. Logistic Support
The afloat logistic support capability for the Indian Navy has not
developed as rapidly as other components of the fleet. The current underway
replenishment capability is provided by two Deepak class oilers acquired in
1967 and 1975 from Germany. These vessels are chartered to the Indian Navy
by the civilian company that paid for their construction, which the navy
could not afford. This is indicative of the past low priority given to
replenishment ships by naval planners. These vessels are capable of
alongside and astern refueling, as well as dry cargo transfer. Five additional
support tankers round out the logistic capability of the surface fleet. These
vessels are not capable of traditional underway replenishment operations but
do provide a fuel "shuttle" capability to augment the replenishment ships.
The future plans for replenishment vessels currently consist of one
replenishment and repair vessel of German design under construction at
Calcutta. This vessel is similar to the Deepak class but with additional repair
capabilities provided. Construction was started in 1987 and the ship should be
completed by 1992 (Sharpe, 1990, p. 273).
As one Indian naval writer observed "Any naval growth,
unaccompanied by the creation of support facilities and bases capable of
sustaining fleet movements in a particular theater of operations, will
ultimately be transformed into a brittle expansion that severely impedes
deployment and retards operations." (Tellis, Part II 1990, p. 43) In this aspect
the Indian Navy has decidedly shown significant modernization and
expansion of support facilities. The most dramatic example of this expansion
has been the modernization of the facilities at Port Blair in the Andaman
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Islands. The development of this facility, which sits astride the Malacca
Straits, was authorized in 1973 to "serve as a focal point for the defence of the
eastern coasts..." (Singh, 1987, p. 10) Additionally, major shipyard capabilities
are present in Bombay, Goa, Calcutta, and Vishakhapatnam. A major port
facility is under development at Karwar that will be capable of providing
support to aircraft carriers and other combatants (Grazebrook, 1987, p. 58).
The base and logistic support that these facilities provide to the Indian surface
fleet will continue to be improved and modernized over the next few years.
6. Ship Design and Weapons Trends
The Indian surface fleet has made many improvements in ship
design over the past 20 years. A major preference has been demonstrated for
gas turbine engines over steam propulsion. In 1971, the majority of the fleet
was steam powered. By 1990, over 50% of the surface combatant force was
powered by gas turbines. The reliability, responsiveness, and ease of
maintenance of these engines apparently appeal to the Indian naval
leadership. The Petya II, Tarantul I and Kashin II classes all feature gas
turbine propulsion. When gas turbines are not practical, Indian designers
have utilized modern diesel propulsion systems. These systems are featured
in the Khukri, Pauk II, and Nanuchka classes. The Project 15 destroyers
(India's newest destroyer class) are planned to utilize combined diesel and gas
turbine (CODAG) propulsion-technology that represents the state-of-the-art in
non-nuclear propulsion. (Sharpe, 1990, p. 265-69)
The weapon systems trend in the Indian surface combatant force has
been toward greater utilization of missile technology. Both SSMs and SAMs
have received greater priority since the 1971 war. Currently, 68% of the
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principal surface combatants in the Indian Navy have SSM capability. This
contrasts sharply with the non-existence of this capability (with the exception
of short range patrol craft) in the early 1970s. All new construction surface
combatants will have SSM capability. The number of SAM systems added to
the Indian fleet has also increased over the past two decades. Currently, over
70% of the surface combatants have SAM systems, as opposed to less than
10% in the 1970s (Sharpe, 1990, p. 265-69). Although these systems are short
range by Western standards, they do add significant air defense capability to
the surface force. These trends, combined with the move toward modern
propulsion systems, indicate that the Indian Navy is committed to acquiring a
capable and reliable force that has the ability to go in harm's way.
The Indian surface force has had very little operational experience
other than exercises since the 1971 war. The interventions in Sri Lanka and
the Maldives were essentially land and air operations and presented little
opportunity for the navy to play a decisive role, although they were
indicative of an Indian willingness to assume the role of regional
"policeman." The Indian surface fleet is, however, definitely a formidable
and capable fighting force. The modernization and development of the
surface force will likely continue well into the next century, and the Indian
Navy will endeavor to remain prepared to repeat its success in the 1971 war
in any future conflict.
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III. CURRENT AND PROJECTED INDIAN SURFACE FORCE
COMPOSITION
A. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
The Indian aircraft carriers and their associated aviation assets constitute
the primary offensive capability of the Indian surface fleet. The two carriers
currently in the Indian inventory are limited by U.S. standards, yet represent
the only regional carrier force in the Indian Ocean littoral region. Future
developments of this carrier force will have significant impact on the strategic
balance in the region.
1. Majestic Class
The British-built Majestic class carrier INS Vikrant (ex-HMS
Hercules) (see Figure 2) was the first carrier acquired by the Indian Navy. The
Vikrant has seen service continuously since 1961 and will probably reach the
end of its service life toward the end of the decade.
The Vikrant has undergone several refits and modernization
programs designed to retain credible combat capability until a replacement is
obtained. The Vikrant had major overhauls in 1979, 1983, and 1987-1989.
The last overhaul was intended to increase service life to 1997. During this
overhaul, the Vikrant's steam catapults were removed and a 10-degree ski
ramp was installed to allow short takeoff rolls for the Sea Harriers (vice a
high fuel consumption vertical launch) (Sharpe, 1990, p. 265). The basic
tactical
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NAME: Vikrant (R 21)
BUILDERS: Vickers-Armstrong Ltd.
COMMISSIONED IN INDIAN NAVY: 1961
PROPULSION: 4 boilers; 2 shafts
SPEED: 245 knots
RANGE: 12,000 nm at 14 knots;
6200 nm at 23 knots
ARMAMENT: 7-40 mm; additional 30mm
ADMGs
AIRCRAFT: 6 Sea Harriers FRS Mk 51
(capacity for 22)
9 Sea King Mk 42 ASW/ASUW
COMBAT DATA SYSTEMS: Selenia IPN- 10
added in 1985
DISPLACEMENT: 19,500 tons
RADARS: 1 D-band air Search
1 E/F-band air/surface search
1 I-band navigation
SONARS: 1 hull-mounted active
Figure 2. Majestic class Aircraft Carrier
(Source: Sharpe, 1990, p. 265)
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data system is of Italian design and is essentially a threat evaluation and
management tool rather than a true NTDS system such as those used by the
U.S. Navy. (Rackham, 1990, p. 26)
The Vikrant, despite these improvements, is rapidly moving towards
obsolescence. Reduced operational tempo and additional refits may extend
service life yet again, but the Vikrant is most likely past the point of
diminishing returns for additional large-scale investments. This ship may
have continued use after removal from front-line service as an assault carrier
using Sea King Mk42C transport helicopters (Prezelin, 1990, p. 235).
2. Hermes class
The British Hermes class carrier INS Viraat (ex-HMS Hermes) (see
Figure 3) was obtained from Britain in 1987 following an intensive refit and
overhaul. During this refit period, the Viraat received new fire control
equipment, navigation radars, and deck landing aids. The ship's boilers were
converted to utilize distillate fuel and NBC capabilities were improved. The
British Seacat missile system was removed, to be replaced at a future date by
another SAM system (probably of Soviet origin). (Sharpe, 1990, p. 264)
Additionally, the Vikrant has a transport capability of 750 troops and four
LCVPs.
The Viraat is the pride of the Indian fleet and serves as the flagship.
The Viraat has significantly better construction and is potentially more
survivable than Vikrant. The flight deck is reinforced and the magazines and
machinery spaces are protected by 1-2 inches of armor (Sharpe, 1990, p. 264).
The Viraat, combat-tested during the Falklands War, will likely remain in
service with the Indian Navy well into the next century.
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rNAME: Viraat (R 22)
BUILDERS: Vickers Shipbuilding
COMMISSIONED IN INDIAN NAVY: 1987
PROPULSION: 4 boilers; 2 shafts
SPEED: 28 knots
RANGE: Similar to Vikrant
ARMAMENT: 30mmADMGs;
future SAM system
SONARS: 1 hull-mounted active
AIRCRAFT: 12 Sea Harriers FRS Mk 51
(capacity for 30)
7 Sea King Mk 42B/C
ASW /ASUW/VERTREP
COMBAT DATA SYSTEMS: Selenia IPN-10
added in 1985
DISPLACEMENT: 28,700 tons




Figure 3. Hermes class Aircraft Carrier
(Source: Sharpe, 1990, p. 264)
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3. Future Developments
There are no naval warships, with the possible exception of
battleships, that inspire the same awe and sense of power that an aircraft
carrier does. Although small by Western standards, the Indian aircraft
carriers represent the pride and most potent striking capability of the Indian
Navy. The future development of the Navy will likely continue to center
about some type of aircraft carrier. Some Indian naval writers have called for
a force of five carriers for the Indian Navy. (Roy, 1990, p. 73) Whether this
desire will ever become a reality remains to be seen, however it is apparent
that additional carriers are definitely in the plans of the Indian naval
leadership.
India's next aircraft carrier is scheduled to be built in the shipyard at
Cochin. Construction of this ship is scheduled to begin by the end of 1991
with commissioning planned for 1997. The French General Armaments
Delegation's Naval Construction Directorate (DCN) conducted the design
study for this carrier and the resulting proposal was selected over British and
Soviet offers. The new carrier, reported to be of 30-35,000 tons displacement,
will be of similar design to the French Charles de Gaulle class carrier,
although not nuclear powered. The carrier is expected to operate up to 40
aircraft (CTOL or V/STOL) and will be a significantly more capable platform
than the current Indian carriers (Mukherjee, 1989, p. 1124). Although the
choice of conventional or V/STOL aircraft for the new carrier has yet to be
publicly articulated (both types were considered in the design studies), Indian
naval observers have stated that the naval leadership appears to believe that
conventional carriers are what is needed for India's future naval
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requirements (Tellis, Part II 1990, p. 37). The final choice of carrier type may
depend to a large degree on the availability of carrier aircraft. Indian naval
sources have stated that a conventional carrier would be preferred if the
Indian Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) or French Rafale aircraft were available.
If not, then a V/STOL configuration to best utilize the Sea Harriers would be
the likely choice (Prakash, 1990, p. 68). Regardless of what type of carrier
ultimately enters service with the Indian Navy, it is clear from the expressed
views of the naval leadership that a naval aviation capability is a critical
component of the Indian force structure. As one naval writer summarized,
"air power at sea is the single most important factor in shaping fleet tactics
and in the conduct of maritime operations." (Samaddar, 1991, p. 2)
B. DESTROYERS
1. Kashin II Class
The five Soviet Kashin II class destroyers (see Figure 4) currently in
the Indian inventory are the most capable surface combatants in the fleet.
Acquired during the 1980s, these vessels gave the Indian Navy a force of
modern combatants more suited for offensive operations than the older
frigates in the fleet.
This class was built as new construction for India in the Soviet Union
and have several modifications, including a helicopter hangar in place of the
aft 76 mm mount and SS-N-2C launchers that are located in front of the
superstructure, facing forward, rather than facing aft as in the Soviet design.
The five Kashin II destroyers possess the widest array of weaponry of any
Indian warships and with the SA-N-1 SAM system (17 nm range), provide
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PROPULSION: 4 gas turbines; 2 shafts
ARMAMENT: 4 SS-N-C STYX ASM
Vtft ml
4 2 SA-N-1 GOA
2 76mm guns
8 30mmADMG
' jLMy^,>~k7w^C^|t* 5 21 in. torpedoes
~\_3 1 2 RBU 6000 ASW mortars







RADARS: 1 C-band Air Search
inj
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'/: 2 I-band Navigation
2 H/I-band Fire Control








RANGE: 4500 nm at 18 knots; 900 nm atiJ 35 knots
Figure 4. Kashin II class Destroyer
(Source: Sharpe, 1990, p. 264)
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the Indian Navy with the only significant AAW protection currently in the
fleet. These vessels are the nucleus of the escort force and will remain in
service for the foreseeable future. (Sharpe, 1990, p. 265)
2. Future Developments
One of India's most ambitious indigenous ship construction projects
is currently in progress to expand and improve the destroyer force. This
program, designated Project 15, is intended to furnish the Indian Navy's
principal surface combatant for the next 20 years (Tellis, Part II 1990, p. 39).
Project 15 (Table III) represents many firsts for India. These will be the largest
warships designed and constructed in India (albeit with Soviet assistance) and
will be the first indigenously designed ships to be powered by gas turbine
engines.
Foreign technology will still be important as the gas turbines will be
of Soviet design in the first unit and will be license-built U.S. LM2500 engines
in the follow-on units. The first Project 15 destroyer (INS Delhi) is scheduled
for commissioning in early 1995. (Todd, 1991, p. 234)
TABLE III. PROJECT 15 DESTROYER
(Sources: Sharpe, 1991, p. 264, and Todd, 1991, p. 234)
NAME: Delhi (2 additional on order) AIRCRAFT: 2 Sea King Mk 42B
BUILDERS: Mazagon Dock, Bombay DISPLACEMENT: 6500 tons
COMMISSIONED: Planned 1995 RADARS: Indra Air Search
PROPULSION: CODAG: 2 gas turbines and Additional others
2 MTU diesels SONARS: Indian-developed VDS or
ARMAMENT: 2 76mm guns towedarray;
4 SS-N-22 SSM Bharat Apsoh hull-mounted




Frigates constitute the bulk of the Indian surface combatant force and
range from old steam-powered vessels to modern gas-turbine warships. New
construction programs are in progress to modernize and improve this
component of the surface combatant force.
1. Godavari Class
The three Godavari class frigates (Figure 5) were the result of one of
the first major indigenous warship construction programs attempted by India.
The Godavari class is based on a modified Leander design and has an
indigenous composition of 72%.
The Gomati was the first Indian ship to have digital electronics
included in the combat data system. Although able to accommodate two
helicopters, for stability reasons only one is usually embarked along with
several crews (Prezelin, 1990, p. 238). The Godavari class was a major first step
for India's indigenous production capability. These vessels do have some
drawbacks, however. The mix of Soviet, Western, and Indian weapons
systems have resulted in some equipment compatibility problems.
Additionally, poor welding has been observed on Godavari. These and other
problems are the likely reason that plans for an additional three vessels in the
class have been discarded and an improved version (Project 16A) is being
developed. (Sharpe, 1990, p. 266)
2. British Leander class
The six Leander class frigates (Figure 6) are the primary ASW ships of
the Indian Navy. These vessels, with a 60% indigenous component were the
first major warships to be constructed in Indian shipyards.
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1* BUILDERS: Mazagon Dock, Bombay
COMMISSIONED: 1983-1988
PROPULSION: 4 boilers, 2 shafts
ARMAMENT: 4 SS-N-2C STYX SSM
1 SA-N-4 SAM
•






6 ILAS 3 torpedoes
RANGE: 4500 nm at 12 knots
DATA SYSTEM Selenia IPN-10
•"^ili1 SPEED: 27 knots
AIRCRAFT: 2 Sea King or
JppC*:. 1 Sea King and 1 Chetak
DISPLACEMENT: 4000 tonsQ v
RADARS: 1 D-band Air Search
1 E-band 3D Air/Surface
Si Searchyfa-A
1 I-band navigation




1 FH/I-band Fire Control
t (SA-N-4)
1 G/H-band Fire Control
j (57 mm)
fcj
, SONARS: 1 Hull-mounted
1 VDS
Figure 5. Godavari Class Frigate








BUILDERS: Mazagon Dock, Bombay
COMMISSIONED: 1972-81
PROPULSION: 2 boilers, 2 shafts
RANGE 4500 ran at 12 knots
DATA SYSTEM: Selenia IPN-10
SPEED: 27 knots
DISPLACEMENT: 2962 tons
AIRCRAFT: 1 Chetak or
1 Sea King (F41 and F42)
RADARS: 1 D-band Air Search
1 I-band Surface Search
2 I-band Navigation
2 I/I-band Fire Control
SONARS: 1 Hull-mounted active
1 VDS
ARMAMENT: 4 SS-N-2B STYX SJ
2 SEACAT SAM
2 45 in guns
2 20mm guns
6 324 mm torpedoes
1 ASW mortar
Figure 6. Leander Class Frigate
(Source: Sharpe, 1990, p. 267)
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As the Leander class undergo refits, the SSM and sonar capabilities
are being upgraded and modernized (Sharpe, 1991, p. 267). These vessels will
continue in service until past the end of the decade.
3. Soviet Petya-II Class
The six remaining Petya II class frigates (INS Andaman sank in 1990)
were the first Soviet ships acquired by the Indian Navy. Although a
substantial improvement in capability at the time, the Petya II class (Figure 7)
are at the end of their service lives and are planned for decommissioning in
the next two years. The limited offensive capabilities of these ASW vessels
make their survival unlikely in a modern war at sea (Sharpe, 1991, p. 267).
The likely role for these vessels during their remaining time in service will
be that of coastal defense (Sojka, 1983, p. 7).
4. British Whitby Class
The two Whitby class ASW frigates (Figure 8) are the oldest frigates in
the Indian fleet. These vessels were modernized in 1982-1983 and a helicopter
hangar and deck were added. The age and marginal offensive capabilities of
this class, however, should result in their decommissioning by 1995-1996.
(Sharpe, 1990, p. 268)
5. British Leopard Class
The one vessel of the Leopard class (Figure 9) is also nearing the end
of its useful life. With limited AAW and ASW capability, the major role this
vessel could play would be that of an NGFS platform. The two 4.5-inch dual-
purpose guns could provide credible gunfire support. This vessel is utilized
normally as a cadet training vessel and will be replaced in the near future.
(Sharpe, 1991, p. 268)
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PROPULSION: 2 gas turbines/1 diesel/3
shafts
RANGE: 4000 nm at 12 knots
DATA SYSTEM: Selenia IPN-10
RADARS: 1 F-band surface search
1 I-band navigation
1 I-band fire control
SONARS: 1 Hull-mounted active
ARMAMENT: 4 76mm guns
3 533 mm torpedoes
4 RBV2500ASW
mortars
2 Depth charge racks
SPEED: 32 knots
DISPLACEMEN1": 1100 tons
Figure 7. Petya U Class Frigate




BUILDERS: Cammell Laird (F40)
Harland & Wolff (F43)
COMMISSIONED: 1960
PROPULSION: 2 boilers/2 shafts
RANGE: 4500 nm at 12 knots
DATA SYSTEM; Selenia IPN-10
AIRCRAFT: 1 Chetak
RADARS: 1 E/F-band Air/surface search
1 I-band surface search
1 I-band navigation
SONARS: 1 Hull-mounted active





Figure 8. Whitby Class Frigate
(Source: Sharpe, 1991, p. 265)
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NAME: Beas (F 37)
BUILDERS: Vickers-Armstrong
COMMISSIONED: 1960
PROPULSION: 8 diesels/2 shafts
RANGE: 6000 nm at 15 knots
SPEED: 24 knots
RADARS: 1 E/F-band surface search
1 I-band navigation
SONARS: 1 Hull-mounted active




Figure 9. Leopard Class Frigate
(Source: Sharpe, 1991, p. 266)
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6. Future Developments
The future additions to the frigate force will consist of the Project 16A
vessels currently under construction. Little is available in the open press
about Project 16A except that it is an improved version of the Godavari class
and that the first one is planned to be in service in 1994 (Sharpe, 1990, p. 266).
Three of these vessels are currently under construction in Calcutta (Preston,
1991, p. 45)
D. CORVETTES
The corvette forces of the Indian surface fleet are rapidly increasing in
quantity and quality. Soviet as well as Indian programs are in full swing and
will result in an enhanced offensive capability for the Indian Navy.
1. Khukri Class
The Khukri class corvettes (Figure 10) are being constructed to replace
the aging Petya II class frigates. These ships are being designed and built in
India with a total of eight planned. The Khukri class is intended to be used
for extended maritime patrol and have excellent endurance (4000 nm) for a
small combatant. Construction of this class is primarily steel (indigenously
produced) (Mama, 1989, p. 1685). The total indigenous content of this class is
approximately 65% (Sharpe, 1991, p. 269).
The first Khukri class corvettes are oriented towards ASW. The
second group of four will be oriented towards AAW with the addition of an
Indian air search radar and the SA-N-4 SAM system (Sharpe, 1990, p. 269).
This class will eventually be equipped with the Indian Advanced Light
Helicopter (ALH). This aircraft will have an ASUW capability as well as
torpedoes, depth charges and a dipping sonar for ASW. An upgraded follow-
on class to the Khukri class is currently being planned (Mama, 1989, p. 1685).
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NAME: Khukri (P 49)
Kufhar (P50)
Kirpan (P51)
Khanjar (P 52)—fitting out
BUILDERS: Mazagon Docks and Garden
"TV Reach
1




PROPULSION: 2 diesels/2 shafts
RANGE 4000 ran at 18 knots
\z SPEED: 25 knots
RADARS: 1 E-band air search
M 1 I-band air/surface search
frfc
8^ 1 H/I-band fire control
. cvytiM 1 I-band navigation
SONARS: 1 Hull-mounted activeS~3r _r




6 324 mm torpedoes
DISPLACEMENT: 1350 tons
AIRCRAFT: 1 Chetak (to be replaced by
ALH)
Figure 10. Khukri Class Corvette
(Source: Sharpe, 1990, p. 269)
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2. Soviet Pauk II class
The two Pauk II class corvettes (Table IV) are recent additions to the
surface force, imported from the Soviet Union in 1989 and 1990. These
vessels appear to be oriented towards ASW and maritime interdiction as
evidenced by a lack of ASM capability and the addition of a VDS housing on
the stern. A minimum of five of this class is planned.
TABLE IV. PAUK II CLASS CORVETTE











PROPULSION: 2 diesels/2 shafts
RANGE: 2000 run at 20 knots
SPEED: 32 knots
RADARS: 1 E/F-band air/surface search
1 H/I-band fire control
1 I-band navigation
SONARS: 1 VDS
ARMAMENT: 1 SA-N-5 SAM
1 76mmgun
1 30mmgun
4 533 mm torpedoes
2 RBU 1200 ASW mortars
DISPLACEMENT: 520 tons
3. Tarantul I Class
The six Tarantul I class corvettes (Table V) were obtained from the
Soviet Union from 1987-1991. Additional units of this class are being built in
Indian shipyards. Currently 12 additional units are under construction or on
order (Preston, 1990, p. 46-50). The total number planned for this class could
total 24 vessels. (Sharpe, 1990, p. 268) The Tarantul I class are dedicated
ASUW platforms and add significant strike capability to the Indian surface
fleet.
4. Soviet Nanuchka II Class
The three Nanuchka II class corvettes (Table VI) were acquired from
the Soviet Union from 1976 to 1978. These vessels are also dedicated ASUW
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platforms with little AAW and no ASW capability. (Sharpe, 1990, p. 269) No
additional units are scheduled to be purchased, probably as the result of their
poor seakeeping performance. (Prezelin, 1990, p. 240)
TABLE V. TARANTUL I CLASS CORVETTE
(Source: Sharpe, 1991, p. 266)
NAME: Veer (K40) RADARS: 1 E-band air/surface search
Nirbhik (K41) 1 I-band navigation
Nidat (K42) 1 H/I-band fire control
Nishank (K43) SONARS: None
Nirghal (K 44)




COMMISSIONED: 1987-1991 2 30mmADMG
PROPULSION: 4 gas turbines/2 shafts




TABLE VI. NANUCHKA II CLASS CORVETTE
(Source: Sharpe, 1990, p. 267)
NAME: Vijay Durg (K 71)
Sindho Durg (K 72)
Hos Durg (K 73)
BUILDERS: Petrovskiy USSR
COMMISSIONED: 1976-1978
PROPULSION: 3 diesels/3 shafts
RANGE: 2500 nm at 12 knots; 900 nm at 31 kts
SPEED: 34 knots
AIRCRAFT: None
RADARS: 1 I-band air/surface search
1 F/H/I-band fire control
1 G/H-band fire control
1 I-band navigation
SONARS: None





The future plans for the Indian corvette program consist of continual
indigenous production of the Khukri and Tarantul I class vessels. The
addition of Tarantul I units will greatly enhance the Indian Navy's ASUW
capabilities while the Khukri class will provide additional ASW assets (with
improved AAW capabilities) to the fleet. The Indian Navy has recently
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purchased three South Korean Neptune class patrol ships (with four
additional on order). These ships are lightly armed (twenty 40 mm guns) but
can be fitted with additional AAW and ASUW weapons, as are the South
Korean Navy's versions of this class (Sharpe, 1990, p. 270). If this upgrade is
done at a later date, these ships will add considerably to the Indian Navy's
maritime interdiction capability.
E. AMPHIBIOUS FORCES
The amphibious forces of the Indian surface fleet have grown steadily
since the 1970s. Although still only a minor power projection asset, the
continuing new construction and the Indian desire to defend its island
territories indicate that amphibious forces will continue to have a role in
Indian naval strategy.
1. Soviet Polnochny Class LSMs
The eight Polnochny class LSMs (Table VII) were acquired from
Poland during the period 1975 to 1986. Each of this class can carry 350 tons of
equipment and 140 troops. The last four are Polnochny D class and have a
helicopter platform and different radars than the earlier C class. It is reported
that an additional two units of this class may be ordered (Sharpe, 1990, p. 271).
2. Magar Class LST
The Magar class LST (Table VIII) is the largest ship currently built in
India. Based on the British Sir Lancelot class, the Magar class has substantial
troop and tank transport capability. A second unit is under construction in










TABLE VII. POLNOCHNY CLASS LSM










PROPULSION: 5 diesels/3 shafts
RANGE: 2000 nm at 12 knots
RADARS: 1 I-band navigation
1 H/I-band fire control (D
variant only)
ARMAMENT: 4 30mmguns
2 140 mm rocket launchers
DISPLACEMENT: 1150 tons
LIFT: 350 tons; 140 troops
SPEED: 18 knots
AIRCRAFT: Helo platform (D variant only)
TABLE VIII. MAGAR CLASS LST
(Source: Sharpe, 1991, p. 270)
NAME: Magar (L 20) RADARS: 1 navigation
Gharial (L 23) (under construction) armament; 4 40mmeuns
BUILDERS: Garden Reach, Calcutta 2 rocket launchers
PROPULSION: 2 diesels/2 shafts DISPLACEMENT: 5655 tons
RANGE: 8000 nm at 15 knots LIFT: 340 tons
SPEED: 15 knots AIRCRAFT: 1 Sea King 42C
3. Vasco da Gama Class LCU
The seven Vasco da Gama class LCUs (Table IX) are the smallest
Indian amphibious vessels. These ships were built in India from 1978 to 1987.
This class has a relatively short range of 1000 nautical miles and can carry 250
tons of equipment and 125 troops.
4. Future Development
The Indian amphibious forces will continue to expand with the
completion of additional Magar class LSTs and Polnochny class LSMs.
Furthermore, a larger dock landing ship (LSD) is reportedly in the initial
design and planning stages (Prezelin, 1990, p. 242). The addition of these
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vessels will continue to improve India's burgeoning power projection
capabilities.
TABLE IX. VASCO DA GAMA CLASS LCU




LIFT: 250 tons/125 troops
AIRCRAFT: None







PROPULSION: 3 diesels/3 shafts
RANGE: 1000 nm at 8 knots
SPEED: 9 knots
F. LOGISTIC FORCES
The logistic forces of the Indian surface fleet have apparently received the
lowest funding priorities throughout the Indian Navy's existence. Although
current plans include additional replenishment capability, this aspect of the
Indian fleet will need to be greatly improved in order to support any credible
sustained power projection capability.
1. Deepak Class Oiler
The two German Deepak class oilers (Table X) provide the Indian
Navy's only "combat logistics" capability. These vessels were chartered by the
Navy from a civilian firm that had paid for their construction (Sharpe, 1990,
p. 273). This class also is helicopter-capable and has a telescoping hangar and
flight deck. The Deepak class utilizes British-style replenishment rigs and
carries fuel oil, diesel fuel, aviation fuel, fresh water and dry cargo and are
capable of astern and alongside refueling. (Prezelin, 1990, p. 243) The design
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of these ships is being used as the basis for a new class of AOR currently under
construction.
TABLE X. DEEPAK CLASS OILER
(Source: Sharpe, 1991, p. 272)
NAME: Deepak (A 50) RADARS: 1 I-band navigation
Shakti (A 57) ARMAMENT: 4 40mmguns
BUILDERS: Bremer-Vulkan 2 20mmguns
COMMISSIONED: 1972 (A 50) DISPLACEMENT: 15,828 tons
1976 (A 57) CARGO: 1280 tons diesel fuel
PROPULSION: 1 boiler/ 1 shaft 12,624 tons fuel oil
RANGE: 5500 nm at 16 knots Jf?5 tons aviation fuel812 tons fresh water
SPEED: 18.5 knots AIRCRAFT: 1 Chetak
2. Poshak Class Support Tankers
The two Poshak class support tankers (Table XI), completed in 1982
and 1988, possess a significantly smaller cargo capability than the Deepak class
and have no real capability for underway replenishment. The primary use
for these vessels is inport replenishment of surface vessels, and they could
serve to facilitate quicker "turnaround" times for surface combatants during
extended periods of operations.
TABLE XI. POSHAK CLASS SUPPORT TANKER
(Source: Sharpe, 1990, p. 273)
NAME: Poshak RADARS: None
Puran ARMAMENT: None
BUILDERS: Mazagon Dock DISPLACEMENT: 15,828 tons
PROPULSION: 1 diesel/1 shaft CARGO: 200 tons
RANGE: minimal SPEED . 9knots
3. Pradhyak Class Support Tankers
The two Pradhyak class support tankers (Table XII) are similar in
capability to the Poshak class and were completed in 1977 and 1978. These
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vessels have no underway replenishment capability and, like the Poshak
class, are utilized for inport refueling.
TABLE XII. PRADHYAK CLASS SUPPORT TANKER
(Source: Sharpe, 1990, p. 273)
NAME: Pradhyak RADARS: None
Purak ARMAMENT: None
BUILDERS: Rajabagan Yard, Calcutta DISPLACEMENT: 960 tons
PROPULSION: 1 diesel/ 1 shaft CARGO: 376 tons fuel oil
RANGE: minimal STEED: 9 knots
4. Future Developments
The two Deepak class oilers are the Indian navy's only combat
logistics ships and would be hard pressed to support extended fleet operations.
In apparent recognition of this logistic weakness, a new replenishment and
repair ship (similar to U.S. AOR) is under construction. The Rajaba Gan
Palan class (Table XIII) is of German design and is similar to the Deepak class
but longer and has additional machinery repair shops. This class is being
built in Calcutta and will provide Indian shipbuilders with valuable
experience in logistic vessel construction. Currently two vessels of this class
are planned (Sharpe, 1990, p. 273). The addition of these logistic units to the
fleet will greatly enhance the flexibility and sustainability of the Indian
surface fleet.
G. SUMMARY
The Indian surface force has improved steadily in terms of numbers and
capability over the past two decades. As indicated in Table XIV, the number
of vessels has grown in all primary warfare areas with the exception of AAW.
Of interest is the improvement in the ASUW, logistics and amphibious
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warfare areas—categories traditionally associated with power projection. The
capability of the Indian surface force in these areas will continue to improve.
The major weakness has been and will continue to be a lack of effective
organic AAW capability. With that exception, the Indian surface fleet will
continue to develop its power projection and support capabilities over the
next few years.
TABLE XIII. RAJABA GAN PALAN CLASS AOR
(Source: Sharpe, 1991, p. 272)
NAME: Rajaba Gan Palan
BUILDERS: Garden Reach, Calcutta
PROPULSION: probably 2 diesels/1 shaft




DISPLACEMENT: appx. 22,000 tons




TABLE XIV. INDIAN SURFACE FORCE TRENDS: NUMBERS OF SHIPS IN
PRIMARY WARFARE AREAS (1971-96)
YEAR AAW ASW ASUW Logistics Amphibious
1971 3 11 15 4 (1 CLF) 6
1976 4 27 4 (1 CLF) 7
1981 6 27 6 (2 CLF) 11
1985 8 24 6 (2 CLF) 12
1991 15 28 6 (2 CLF) 16
1996
(projected)
24 39 6 (3 CLF) 20
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IV. INDUSTRIAL SUPPORT FOR INDIAN SURFACE FORCE
DEVELOPMENT
A naval force is hollow unless sufficient construction/maintenance,
national industry, and research and development (R&D) assets are available
to maintain that force at a high level of efficiency. Although lacking in
several key areas, India has made major strides in these areas over the past
few years and appears to be committed to improving and expanding the
defense industrial base. (Locations of industrial facilities are provided in
Figure 11.)
A. SHIPYARDS
India has four major shipyards that are engaged in warship construction.
These are:
• Mazagon Docks Ltd. (MDL)
• Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE)
• Goa Shipyard
• Hindustan Shipyard
Although the majority of warships constructed in India have been license
built to foreign designs, the Indian shipbuilding industry has steadily
increased the indigenous content of its warships and has made great strides in
the area of ship design as evidenced by the PROJECT 15 and Khukri class
warships. The fleet support capabilities of these shipyards have also steadily











Figure 11. Major Indian Industrial and Port Locations
(Source: Grazebrook, 1987, p. 59)
1. Mazagon Docks, Ltd.
Mazagon Docks Limited (MDL) is India's principal producer of
warships. MDL, located in Bombay, was a relatively minor shipyard until it
was modernized and expanded in the 1960s to facilitate construction of the
Leander class frigates (Singh, 1987, p. 6). Like all of the major shipyards in
India, MDL is state-owned and operated. Additional modernization
programs were implemented at MDL during the 1980s with the construction
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of a carrier-capable drydock and the establishment of a heavy diesel engine
repair shop. (Ministry of Defence, 1989, p. 11) MDL currently is involved in
the following construction programs:
• 2 Project 15 destroyers under construction
• 4 Tarantul I class corvettes under construction
• 2 Tarantul I class corvettes on order
• 1 Khukri class corvette fitting out (Preston, 1991, p. 50)
The shipbuilding expertise of MDL, gained during construction of the
Leander, Godavari, Khukri and Tarantul I classes, combined with current and
future contracts will allow MDL to remain India's premier shipyard.
2. Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers
The second major naval shipyard is Garden Reach Shipbuilders &
Engineers (GRSE) located in Calcutta. For many years, GRSE was primarily a
small combatant construction facility. In recent years, however, GRSE has
significantly diversified construction projects to include amphibious and
logistics vessels as well as auxiliary naval machinery. In 1988, GRSE signed a
license agreement with West Germany to indigenously manufacture marine
diesel engines and generators for naval vessels. That same year, GRSE
converted a slipway into a warship construction berth (Government of India,
1989, p. 30). Current naval projects at GRSE include:
• Three Project 16A frigates on order
• Two Khukri class corvettes fitting out
• Four Neptune class patrol vessels on order
• One Magar class LST under construction
• One Rajaba Gan Palan replenishment ship under construction
(Preston, 1991, p. 45)
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The current and anticipated naval construction projects, combined
with ongoing modernization, will allow GRSE to grow in importance as a
source of warships for the Indian Navy.
3. Goa Shipyard Limited
Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL), located in Goa, is a subsidiary of MDL
and is primarily involved in the construction of smaller ships for the Indian
Navy. (Howarth, 1986, p. 443). GSL built several of the Indian Navy's LCUs,
as well as oceanographic and minor auxiliaries (Prezelin, 1990, p. 244).
Facilities at GSL were improved in the 1980s with the establishment of steel
cutting and blasting facilities. (Government of India, 1989, p. 31) Current
naval construction projects consist primarily of license production of 9
Tarantul I class frigates currently on order (Preston, 1991, p. 46). Due to its
limited facilities, GSL will likely remain the smallest of India's naval
shipbuilding companies.
4. Hindustan Shipyard
Hindustan Shipyard, located in Vishakhapatnam, is physically the
largest shipyard in India (Sojka, 1983, p. 12). Despite its size, Hindustan
Shipyard has concentrated primarily on the construction of smaller vessels
for the Indian Navy while devoting most of its resources to commercial
production. The main naval project now active is the license production of
the Neptune class offshore patrol ships (Lenton, 1991, p. 186). Some press
reports list Hindustan Shipyard as the site of the construction of India's next
aircraft carrier, but most sources seem to indicate that the construction will be
done at the naval shipyard at Cochin. For the foreseeable future, Hindustan
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Shipyard will probably remain oriented towards small combatant
construction.
B. BASES
After warships are provided to the fleet by the shipyards, maintenance
and overhauls are usually accomplished at the Indian Navy's major bases.




• Port Blair (Andaman Islands)
The naval base at Bombay, India's major naval facility, includes the
headquarters of the Western Naval Command, berthing facilities and a large
naval shipyard (Sharpe, 1990, p. 260). Bombay currently has two carrier berths
and additional piers and a carrier-capable drydock are currently under
construction. Maintenance facilities are extensive and are continually being
upgraded (Government of India, 1989, p. 11). The naval shipyard has recently
added improved diesel maintenance, rubber manufacturing and non-
destructive testing facilities to allow for more efficient and responsive fleet
maintenance support (Singh, 1990, p. 7).
The naval base at Vishakhapatnam houses the headquarters of the
Eastern Naval Command, berthing facilities, and a major naval shipyard.
The shipyard was extensively refurbished and modernized during the 1980s
with extensive Soviet assistance (Sharpe, 1990, p. 260). Additional
modernization plans include new drydock facilities, degaussing facility, and a
marine gas turbine overhaul facility that will eliminate the need to send gas
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turbines overseas for overhaul (Government of India, 1989, p. 11).
Vishakhapatnam is also having berthing facilities expanded to accommodate
aircraft carriers. (Nadkarni, 1991, p. 28)
The naval base at Cochin houses the headquarters of the Southern Naval
Command and the majority of the Indian Navy's training establishments. A
ship repair facility is located at Cochin and is being upgraded and improved
(Sharpe, 1990, p. 260). Various press reports list Cochin as the probable
construction site for India's indigenous carrier. With the addition of a
Southern Fleet possible in the near future, Cochin would become a facility of
increasing importance. (NOTE: Details of a possible formation of an
additional fleet are provided in Chapter VI.)
The naval facility located at Port Blair in the Andaman Islands houses the
Indian Navy-commanded joint organization responsible for the Andaman
and Nicobar Islands (The command is called FORTAN-Fortress
Andaman/Nicobar). Port Blair was originally a small patrol craft base but has
grown over recent years to become a major naval facility in a key strategic
position dominating the Malacca Straits. The base repair organization at Port
Blair has been augmented to provide short overhauls for ships based there.
Additionally, a floating drydock has been added and base facilities have been
modernized (Government of India, 1989, p. 11). These enhancements have
converted Port Blair into one of the Indian Navy's largest bases (Tellis, Part II
1990 p. 44).
The major base development currently in progress is the construction of a
naval base at Karwar. This project (designated Project Sea Bird) will result in
the development of Asia's largest naval facility (Tellis, Part II 1990, p. 43).
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Berthing and dry dock facilities for aircraft carriers and surface combatants are
planned and the initial phase of construction is due to be completed in 1996.
(Sharpe, 1990, p. 260). A combined Australian/Dutch partnership participated
in the planning and designing of the facility, which is estimated to cost
approximately two billion dollars (1989 U.S.) over the next 25 years.
(Hamilton, 1989, p. 14). The development of the base at Karwar will place
Indian surface combatants closer to Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean operating
areas and will significantly ease the current congestion at Bombay (Tellis, Part
II 1990 p. 43). The base at Karwar is planned to be the new homeport of the
Western Fleet upon completion, unless a third fleet is formed and based at
Karwar (Singh, 1987, p. 19).
Additional naval facilities, albeit of a smaller scale, are available to the
Indian Navy at Madras and Calcutta. Seven minor facilities are located in the
Lakshadweep island chain (part of the Laccadive archipelago) and currently
are the bases for patrol craft. Tentative plans call for extensive expansion and
fortification of these facilities (Tellis, Part II 1990, p. 43).
The various naval bases of the Indian Navy are modern industrial
facilities capable of providing quality support to the fleet. The geographic
dispersion of these bases reduces their vulnerability to simultaneous attack
and allows ease of access to operating areas for fleet units. The facilities are
situated ideally adjacent to vital SLOCs. The establishment of first-class bases
is a key factor behind the development and improved capabilities of the
Indian surface fleet. (NOTE: a list of Indian naval bases is provided in
Appendix C).
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C RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
The Indian military establishment is supported by one of the most
extensive defense research and development (R&D) organizations in the
world. India's defense research budget has typically comprised two percent of
the defense budget and eleven percent of the total government research
allocations. A significant increase in R&D funding, however, was received in
1988-89 when 5.15% of the defense budget was allocated to R&D (Prakash,
1988, p. 28). The R&D structure consists of 46 major R&D organizations
(facilities and laboratories) and are organized under the Defense Research and
Development Organization (DRDO) (Howarth, 1986, p. 436). A list of these
facilities is provided in Appendix E. The laboratories that are specifically
dedicated to naval support are the following:
• Naval Physical & Oceanography Laboratory
• Naval Chemical & Metallurgical Laboratory
• Naval Science & Technological Laboratory
The Naval Physical & Oceanography Laboratory (NPOL), located in
Cochin, has conducted extensive research in sonar technology development
and is producing equipment that is reputed to be of similar quality as foreign
designs. State-of-the-art hull-mounted and variable-depth sonars are either
in production or under development. The Advanced Panoramic Sonar,
Hull-Mounted (APSOH) system is installed in the Godavari and Leander
classes and will be included in the Project 16A class warships. NPOL is also
developing improved sonobuoy hardware and processing systems, as well as
sonar simulations for improved training (Prakash, 1988, p. 27). As these
54
systems become operational, they will contribute significantly to improving
the ASW capabilities of the Indian surface fleet.
There is not a great deal of information available concerning the projects
of the Naval Chemical & Metallurgical Laboratory (NCML). NCML, located
in Bombay, has worked jointly on many projects headed by other laboratories.
The major thrust of recent research at NCML appears to be in the areas of
corrosion control and anti-fouling (Prakash, 1988, p. 27). Continuing
development in these areas could be indicative of a desire to operate warships
for extended periods of time away from home waters.
The Naval Science & Technology Laboratory (NSTL), located in
Vishakhapatnam, is involved extensively with the development of
torpedoes. The lightweight homing torpedo, NST-58, has been deployed
aboard the Godavari and Leander class frigates as a substitute for imported
Italian torpedoes (Prakash, 1988, p. 27). The development of the NST-58 and
its associated launch systems, along with the current development of
additional active/passive ASW torpedoes, is another indication of the
importance of ASW to the Indian Navy and a reflection of the desire of the
Indian Navy to be less dependent on foreign sources for weapons
procurement.
Although the facilities discussed above are dedicated to naval support,
many other defense laboratories are engaged in naval R&D, especially in the
development of electronics and radar. The development of EW systems and
radars for the Indian Navy by Bharat Electric, of the Advanced Lightweight
Helicopter (ALH) by Hindustan Aeronautics, Ltd and the production of chaff
systems by the Explosive R&D Establishment are a few examples of the
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diversity of R&D organizations involved in naval projects (Howarth, 1986,
p. 440).
The growth in the defense R&D community will gradually be reflected in
increased sophistication and capabilities of Indian military systems. A former
defense official stated that India's ability to reduce its dependence on foreign
sources is dependent upon "... the growth of domestic R&D and technology
on the one side and industrial strength on the other ..." (Seshan, 1988, p. 18).
This desire for increased self-reliance and capable weapons capabilities will
likely result in a continued emphasis on defense R&D.
D. DEFENSE INDUSTRY
Extensive defense R&D efforts are of little value unless systems can be
produced and delivered to users in a timely and efficient manner. India has a
large defense infrastructure devoted to military systems production. Much of
this industry was initially inherited from Great Britain and has been
developed by India in the years since independence (Jones, 1986, p. 182). The
Department of Defence Production & Supplies manages the Indian defense
industry, which currently consists of 36 ordnance factories and eight Defense
Public Sector Undertakings (essentially large state-controlled contractors) and
employs approximately 285,000 scientists and engineers (Ragunthan, 1990, p.
29). Although many of these facilities handle projects for each of India's
armed services, the facilities dedicated to or heavily involved in naval hull
construction or ship systems are:
• Bharat Dynamics Ltd.
• Bharat Electronics Ltd.
• Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Ltd.
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• Goa Shipyards Ltd.
• Mazagon Dock Ltd.
A list of defense production facilities is provided in Appendix F.
GRSE, GSL, and MDL have been discussed previously. An additional
note is that these companies, besides ship construction, do extensive work in
the manufacture of engineering equipment, turbines, pumps, and auxiliary
machinery. Bharat Dynamics Ltd. and Bharat Electronics Ltd. (BEL), one of
the largest defense companies in India, produce naval systems such as fuses,
torpedo electronics, fire control equipment, radars, sonars and naval
communications equipment.
The development of the defense R&D and production organizations have
allowed India to make great strides toward defense self-reliance. India still
depends to a large degree, however, on foreign sources for component
technologies such as metal alloys and computer electronics (Vlahos, 1988, p.
11). Despite these weaknesses, India's potential for eventual defense
autonomy appears good. The defense technicians and scientists, augmented
with university and civilian public sector R&D staff, favor India with the
third largest pool of technical personnel in the world (Clad, 1990, p. 47). This
potential, combined with the stated goal of India's Secretary of Defense
Production of "self-reliance, with particular reference to indigenization in the
face of fast-changing technology ..." (Raghunathan, 1990, p. 30) could lead to
virtual defense autonomy in most production areas by the end of the decade.
One significant exception, however, is in the area of naval self-reliance.
Despite future promise, the present reality is that the Indian Navy is the
most dependent of the armed forces on foreign suppliers (followed closely by
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the Indian Air Force), especially for weapons stocks. The surface fleet is
moving rapidly toward self-sufficiency in the areas of ship construction and
naval system design. A glaring exception to this trend, however, is evidenced
in surface ship weaponry.
During the 1980s, Soviet STYX SSMs, SA-N-1 and SA-N-5 SAMs and
British Sea Skua SSMs were all imported by India as a result of no substantial
development in indigenous systems (SIPRI, 1990, p. 278). The Soviet Union
has been India's major naval weaponry supplier for many years. The Indian
government purchased these systems from the Soviets with rupees which
were then used by the Soviets to purchase Indian products such as
agricultural items—essentially a barter system. In 1989, the Soviet Union
indicated a desire for hard currency for naval weapons—a position likely to
strengthen with increasing Soviet fiscal problems (Tellis, 11 September 1991).
In order to maintain operational readiness, the Indian Navy, at least for the
near-term, will probably continue to rely on Soviet imports. Given the
current Soviet financial problems and need for currency, however, weapons
transfer terms favorable to India will likely result. Although India also has
domestic financial concerns, it is definitely in a stronger economic position
relative to the Soviet Union and will have significant negotiating leverage.
The Indian defense establishment provides strong support for the
development, maintenance, and deployment of surface warships but in the
past has done little (with the exception of ASW ordnance) to enhance the
surface fleet's ability to fight and prevail in harm's way. The first steps are
apparently being taken with the current development of India's first
indigenous SAM—the Trishul (Sharpe, 1991, p. 270). This system will,
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however, be of limited capability and the Indian Navy will remain reliant on
foreign sources, especially the Soviet Union, for sophisticated AAW and
ASUW weapons for at least the rest of the decade. A commitment to the
development of hi-tech naval weaponry, apparently not yet a primary goal of
the Indian leadership, will be needed to eliminate this area of self-sufficiency
weakness for the Indian Navy.
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V. EVALUATION OF INDIAN SURFACE FORCES
The model utilized by this study to evaluate the capabilities of the Indian
surface force is that presented by RADM J. R. Hill in his book Maritime
Strategy for Medium Powers. The model evaluates navies on the basis of
their capabilities in the following categories:
• Normal conditions
• Low intensity operations
• Higher level operations
Although Hill's model is used to evaluate navies as a whole, this study will
utilize that model to address the capabilities of the Indian surface force in




In his model, Hill stresses that readiness is of vital importance if a
navy is to establish credible deterrence and react to the fast pace of modern
naval warfare. Deterrence, according to Hill, "... demands that forces should
be capable of credibly effective action against vital interests." (Hill, 1986, p. 88).
Measured to this standard, the Indian surface fleet poses a credible deterrent
to other regional navies. With more principal surface combatants than any
other regional nation (except China, although the PRC Navy is essentially of
coastal orientation) (see Table XV), and a willingness to act as demonstrated
in the 1971 war and regional crises, India has averted any real naval threat to
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its security for 20 years. Additionally, the geographical organization of other
Indian fleets into the Eastern and Western Naval Commands, combined with
India's ideal geographic location astride major trade routes, places the surface
fleet in an excellent position to react quickly to crises requiring naval forces.
TABLE XV. REGIONAL PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS
(1974-91)
Source: Jane's Fighting Ships (1974-1991)
Year India Pakistan China Australia Iran Indonesia Malaysia
1974 29 7 49 12 11 27 2
1978 28 8 23 12 11 11 2
1982 33 12 35 12 11 10 2
1986 32 8 49 12 11 10 4
1990 38 17 56 12 8 16 4
1991 42 16 47 12 5 17 4
2. Effectiveness




In the modern era of hi-tech weaponry and limited reaction time,
along with the traditional difficulties associated with operating equipment in
a maritime environment, sound procurement and maintenance procedures
are essential in order to support a capable naval force. Hill refers to this as
"materiel efficiency."
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According to Hill's model, in order for a navy to achieve materiel
efficiency, naval materiel "... must be within the capacity of the owner state as
regards not only initial cost but ability to maintain." (Hill, 1986, p. 90). The
more sophisticated equipment will require maintenance and repair
capabilities of equal sophistication. The industrial capabilities of the Indian
defense establishment, outlined previously, are currently able to adequately
maintain the surface fleet with the exception of naval weaponry. Naval
SSMs and SAMs are still exclusively procured from foreign sources. With
these exceptions, although an Indian writer expressed misgivings about the
Indian Navy's readiness (Rikhye, 1990, p. 78), the majority of the open
literature supports the view that the surface fleet has the materiel capability to
engage in short to mid-duration regional conflicts.
A well-maintained naval force is of little value unless the personnel
who operate that force are well trained. The personnel in the Indian Navy
are definitely an asset being described by one Indian expert as "highly
motivated." (Roy, June 1990, p. 242) The heart of the Indian naval training
establishment is the naval training command located at Cochin, along with
the majority of training squadrons and professional naval schools (Roy, 1990,
p. 72). This command coordinates all the naval training in India. Entry level
training is conducted at schools in the Eastern Naval Command. Officer
training is conducted at the Indian Naval Academy at Goa (will move to
Ezhimala in 1992) and at the new College of Naval Warfare established at
Karanja. (Sharpe, 1991, p. 259) In the training arena, the Indian Navy has also
moved toward increased sophistication. In 1991, the Indian Navy acquired
several state-of-the-art ship simulators. India is the only non-Western nation
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to currently have this technology. The simulators provide for enhanced
piloting, replenishment and ship maneuver training (APDR-Newsletter,
1991, p. 23). The Indian surface fleet routinely conducts exercises in the
operating areas of both coasts. These exercises usually stress tactical,
amphibious and replenishment operations (Ministry of Defence, 1986, p. 16).
Recent exercises have also emphasized ASCM defense (JPRS, 1991, p. 70) The
extensive assets devoted to training, combined with the move towards hi-
tech training equipment and the general consensus in the Indian naval
literature that the training levels of the force are adequate, suggest that the
Indian surface fleet has the capability to effectively operate its equipment in a
combat environment. An active duty Indian naval officer wrote "... the Navy
has built up high levels of technical competence and seamanship, with the
ability to operate at considerable distances for extended periods." (Prakash,
1990, p. 62)
The organization of the Indian Navy (Appendix D) is along
geographic lines and is conducive to rapid response to the Bay of Bengal,
Arabian Sea and, to a lesser degree, the Indian Ocean. The Chief of Naval
Staff exercises command through the following flag officers:
• Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Naval Command
(Bombay)
• Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern Naval Command
(Vishakhapatnam)
• Flag Officer Commanding-in Chief, Southern Naval Command
(Cochin)
The C-in-C, Western Naval Command is the superior of the Flag
Officer Commanding Western Fleet and is responsible for all activities on the
western coast. The C-in-C, Eastern Naval Command supervises the Flag
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Officer Commanding Eastern Fleet and is responsible for assets based on the
eastern coast and in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The C-in-C, Southern
Naval Command is responsible for maritime operations to the south of India
and also is responsible for the Lakshadweep Islands. The Flag Officer Naval
Aviation is subordinated to the C-in-C Southern Naval Command. With the
completion of the new base at Karwar, the Southern Naval Command may
have the proposed Southern Fleet included in its organization (Singh, 1987, p.
18). The organization of the Indian Navy into geographical fleets makes good
strategic sense in view of India's long coastline and positional dominance in
the region. As shown in Figure 12, the C-in-C (currently only Western and
Eastern Naval Commands) has naval bases, facilities, training establishments
and shipyards under his command. This organization allows a good deal of
autonomy, flexibility and ease of coordination in planning operations and
maintenance.
There is a great deal of competition between the Western and Eastern
Fleets. Although rivalries of this nature can have unfortunate consequences,
the Indian surface fleet seems to have benefitted from this competition in
terms of competitive spirit and aggressiveness. Indian naval sources state
that, in the 1971 war, each naval command "... operated successfully and
acquired an identity of its own, resulting in victory against the enemy on all
fronts." (Sainik Samachar, February 1990). Although difficult to quantify, the
Indian naval organization seems to fulfill the requirement of Hill's model
that naval forces need to be "... responsive to political direction, controlled to
an appropriate degree by the higher command, coordinated to the best


















Figure 12. Indian Naval C-in-C Command Organization
Source: Jacobs, 1986, p. 121
3. Intelligence gathering and surveillance
The Indian surface fleet currently has no assets known to be dedicated
to intelligence collection. The gathering of intelligence and surveillance, as
relates to the surface fleet, are collateral missions undertaken by naval vessels
in their patrol areas. Intelligence gathering and surveillance support the
following stated missions of the Indian Navy:
• Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) surveillance
• "Big Power" navies monitoring
• Coast guard duties (Singh, 1989, p. 56)
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Surface ships, due to their slow speeds and limited search capabilities,
are inherently unsuited for open ocean surveillance. The continued addition
of naval helicopters to the Indian surface fleet will improve search
capabilities, but the primary platforms for these missions are, and will
continue to be the land-based Dornier 228, IL-38, TU-142M Bear F, and PBN
Defender maritime patrol aircraft (Sharpe, 1991, p. 269). The surface force
would be useful in a surveillance role at choice points such as the Malacca
Straits, where the area of coverage is relatively small.
4. Presence
As Hill points out in his model, the definition and benefits of
presence are hard to describe and quantity. Naval officers have an almost
instinctive appreciation of the diplomatic potential of the sight of a warship
sailing into a foreign port. One result of presence is the indication of an
interest by a nation in the area of presence. Other benefits of presence are to
foster goodwill, demonstrate a way of life, deterrence, support for negotiations
and for economic activities (Hill, 1986, p. 98) Visibility is a key component of
naval presence and, therefore, the best instruments of naval presence are
surface warships.
The Indian surface fleet has demonstrated that naval presence is one
of its primary missions. During the last decade, Indian warships have made
port visits to the following countries: Indonesia, Singapore, Kenya, Japan,
Hong Kong, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia,
Mauritius and many other smaller South Asian nations. In 1987, INS
Godavari embarked on the longest deployment ever undertaken by an Indian
warship. Godavari traveled to Europe, Africa, North and South America and
66
Australia. During this deployment, exercises were conducted with several
foreign navies (Indian Military Yearbook, 1987-88, p. 95). These port visits
and deployments are indicative of a desire of the Indian Navy to be viewed as
a credible and respected naval force and of India to be seen as an important
regional actor. As one Indian defense expert stated "... the Navy is the only
effective instrument to project India's image overseas and to influence the
neighbors in the Indian Ocean area ..." (Sojka, 1983, p. 10). A former Indian
admiral asserted that deployment and visits are examples of "naval power
politics" and "naval influence politics" (Tahliani, 1981, pp. 227-28). The
Indian surface fleet's deployment and port visit trends are strong examples of
Hill's definition of presence.
5. Constabulary Duties
Hill states that the constabulary duties of a navy are those relating to
the enforcement of sovereignty, good order and resource protection (Hill,
1986, p. 99). Although often the function of a nation's coast guard, navies also
have a role to play in these areas. In India's case, the constabulary role is
expressed as one of the Indian Navy's primary missions. Security of island
territories, EEZ policing, maritime boundary monitoring and anti-smuggling
operations have all been expressed in Indian naval literature as legitimate
roles for the Indian Navy (Roy, March 1990, p. 70) The ongoing acquisition of
South Korean offshore patrol ships by the Indian Navy is indicative of the
importance of these missions. Aging vessels such as the Petya II class frigates
and newer units such as the Pauk II class corvettes are well-suited for
constabulary-type operations. Although the Indian Coast Guard is currently
undergoing expansion and modernization, constabulary duties will continue
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to be a primary mission for the Indian Navy. The major weakness of the
Navy in this type of operation is the relatively small number of vessels with
which to monitor large areas of ocean.
B. LOW INTENSITY OPERATIONS
1. Demonstrations of Right
Hill asserts in his model that demonstrations of right are actions
taken by navies to assert their rights under international law (i.e. right of
innocent passage). Other examples are the exercise of fishing rights and
observation of maritime boundaries. Although the term "demonstrations of
right" has not been used in Indian naval literature, the Indian surface fleet
definitely has the capability in numbers and firepower to assert India's rights
in regional waters. The presence and constabulary duties of the Indian Navy
outlined previously contribute directly to India's ability to implement
international law. Hill outlines three requirements for forces supporting
demonstrations of right. These are:
• Sufficient endurance
• Sea or air worthiness
• Handling qualities and manning (Hill, 1986, p. 118).
For operations in the Bay of Bengal, Arabian Sea or northern Indian
Ocean, the Indian surface fleet satisfies these requirements.
2. Demonstration of Resolve
Hill asserts that although related to the concept of demonstration of
right, demonstration of resolve in situations are usually less geographically
focused and less dangerous. The Indian Navy's support of the Indian Army
and Air Force in the Sri Lanka intervention, although involving no combat,
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was an example of the use of the surface fleet to demonstrate the resolve of
the Indian government to prevail in that situation. For similar interventions
against militarily insignificant nations, the Indian surface force will be a
useful, visible tool with which to demonstrate resolve and commitment to
any given policy. Against nations with larger forces, the surface fleet would
have less utility as a coercive instrument.
3. Amphibious Landing by Invitation
Hill's model states that invited amphibious landings (i.e. to support
a friendly government in a crisis) requires units familiar with the nature of
amphibious operations and that have specialized skills. The Indian
amphibious forces are definitely more suited for unopposed landings of this
nature than for landings in the face of hostile fire. The limitations that the
Indian Navy faces in these types of operations are primarily a lack of
significant lift capability and of specialized amphibious troops. The current
amphibious capability of the Indian fleet can only transport approximately a
brigade-sized (2000 man) force to most regional locations. Construction of
additional landing craft will increase this capability in the near future. The
Indian Marine Special Force (IMSF) was established in 1986 and is primarily a
quick-reaction force designed to counter threats to offshore assets and to form
the basis of an offensive amphibious capability (Kulkarni, 1991, p. 10). This
force is suitable for short-term operations, but would need airborne logistic
support for extended operations. The IMSF will be augmented in the near
future with the establishment of a planned second brigade (Sharpe, 1990, p.
260). Although this will improve the amphibious capability of the Indian
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Navy, only amphibious operations of a moderate nature will be possible for
the near term.
4. Evacuation of Nationals
In an era of coups and terrorist operations, navies need to have the
capability to evacuate nationals from dangerous situations. The Indian
surface fleet has a limited capability to accomplish this type of operation and
has demonstrated a willingness to engage in evacuation operations. In
January 1986, INS Godavari was sent to South Yemen to assist in the
evacuation of Indian nationals during the Yemeni crisis. Although
evacuation did not become necessary, the deployment was indicative of
Indian resolve and was the first active deployment of an Indian warship
outside territorial waters in peacetime (Thakur, 1990, p. 4). Future operations
of this type involving large numbers of nationals could be supported by
Indian commercial cargo and passenger ships, most of which are owned by
state-controlled companies and could be available in a crisis (Sojka, 1983, p.
11).
5. Protection of Offshore Installations
The expanding exploitation by India of resources within its EEZ have
resulted in an increased desire to be able to protect those resources and the
installations engaged in their exploitation. The Indian surface fleet will have
an increased role in this arena of naval activity. To illustrate the scope of the
problem, one Indian company (Bombay High) currently has seven oil rigs, 18
platforms, 32 support vessels and 400 miles of oil pipeline (Roy, June 1990, p.
239). The developing Indian frigate and corvette programs will provide the
Indian Navy with additional resources with which to protect its offshore
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installations. This role is well within the capability of the surface fleet to
perform against any non-superpower interlopers into India's territorial
waters.
C HIGHER LEVEL OPERATIONS
As illustrated previously, the Indian surface force has a moderate to good
capability to perform operations in normal conditions and low intensity
operations. Although these operations are important, higher level
operations, up to and including naval battles, are where navies "earn their
pay." It is in these types of operations where the Indian surface fleet currently
has significant limitations as well as some capability. Hill places higher level
operations into two general categories: sea use operations and sea denial
operations. Sea use operations consist of the following:
• Passage of shipping against opposition
• Amphibious landing
• Shore bombardment.
Sea denial operations consist of:
• Denial of passage
• Denial of sea areas.
1. Passage of Shipping against Opposition
The passage of shipping (maritime trade) against opposition is
viewed by Hill as being the most important type of operation during the two
world wars. Hill admits that this type of operation has not occurred since
1945, although, since publication of his book, the U.S. engaged in a less
intense version of this type of operation in OPERATION EARNEST WILL. In
India's case, with enemies traditionally threatening from landward borders
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and the relatively short duration of past conflicts, ensuring the passage of
shipping has not been a necessity. In any future protracted conflict, however,
India's extensive maritime trade could require that this type of operation be
conducted. Hill asserts that two requirements exist to conduct passage
operations: shipping organization and shipping protection (Hill, 1986, p. 138).
The number of Indian ports, combined with a strong merchant marine (834
vessels in 1990), will allow any preplanned organization of convoys to be
accomplished without great difficulty. The challenge for the Indian surface
fleet will be the protection of those convoys.
The majority of the sea lanes that traverse the Indian Ocean region
are within range of land-based aviation assets. In a future war with Pakistan
or other regional actors, Indian mercantile assets would be subject to
maritime strike operations and the Indian Navy would be faced with the
following options to protect the ships under its charge:
• Indian Air Force (IAF) interdiction of enemy aircraft and destruction of
bases.
• Indian naval aviation protection of maritime assets.
• Surface ship AAW protection of maritime assets.
The Indian Air Force, a large and capable force, will likely be heavily
involved in supporting ground forces and engaging enemy air forces in a
future conflict. As one Indian naval writer asserted "... the air force will
never have enough aircraft to divert them for naval missions to the
detriment of their own requirements for favourable air situation,
interdiction, bombardment, air defence and other traditional air force roles"
(Birla, 1986, p. 203). In a protracted war, therefore, the Indian Navy may have
to rely on organic assets for protection from air attack.
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Indian naval aircraft, operating from the two carriers currently in the
fleet, would have a significant challenge in establishing and maintaining air
superiority around shipping formations being protected. The Sea Harrier,
although a capable V/STOL aircraft, will have great difficulty engaging high-
performance land-based aircraft especially those that are not at the limit of
their operational range. This situation is the result of three key weaknesses of
Indian naval aviation.
• Relatively low speed of the Sea Harriers compared to land-based
aircraft.
• Few numbers of aircraft currently deployed on the two carriers.
• Lack of organic airborne early warning (AEW) capability.
It is unlikely, unless the threat axis is well defined, that sufficient
numbers of Sea Harriers could be vectored to intercepts prior to the weapons
release point of ingressing aircraft.
If the Indian Navy's aircraft are unable to successfully interdict
inbound air raids, the burden of shipping protection will fall on the surface
escorts. This is a challenge that the surface combatants currently will have
difficulty meeting. The air search radars of the most capable AAW vessels
(Kashin II and Godavari classes) can detect air targets out to 70 miles. This is a
range at which many aircraft (especially Pakistani ASCM-capable aircraft) will
have already launched their weapons. Of additional concern is the relatively
short range of the Indian Navy's AAW missile systems. The longest range
system, the SA-N-1, is deployed aboard the Kashin II class and can engage
targets at 17 miles. All of the other AAW systems used by the Indian Navy
have engagement ranges of less than 10 miles (Sharpe, 1990, p. 265). These
short engagement ranges allow for fewer engagements of inbound missiles
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on aircraft and greatly decrease the probability of eliminating large numbers
of attackers prior to target impact. The reported addition of the SA-N-7
system to the new Project 15 destroyers will still only allow engagements at a
range of 15 miles. Although a more modern missile than other systems in
the Navy, the short range of the SA-N-7 and the resulting low number of
engagements will do little to prevent rapid air defense saturation (Sharpe,
1991, p. 264).
The Indian surface fleet will have difficulty "fighting through"
shipping against determined air opposition. To its credit, however, the
surface fleet could achieve a good deal of success against regional submarines
and surface threats. The majority of Indian surface combatants have ASW
capability and many have ASW helicopters embarked. The number of ASW
platforms, combined with the R&D emphasis on ASW systems, will give the
Indian Navy a credible ASW capability. ASW is viewed by many Indian
naval writers as of great importance and receives a good deal of emphasis in
training and exercises (Subrahmanyam, 1990, p. 1144). The sinking of the
Pakistani submarine Ghazi as it stalked Vikrant during the 1971 war vividly
demonstrated to the Indian Navy the effectiveness of an aggressive ASW
strategy. The ASCM capability of Indian surface warships, combined with the
ASUW capabilities of the Sea Harriers and some helicopters, will make it
exceedingly difficult for a regional SAG to launch a devastating attack on
escorted shipping formations. The ASUW capability of the Indian surface
fleet will be greatly augmented with the planned deployment of SS-N-22
ASMs aboard the Project 15 destroyers (Sharpe, 1991, p. 264). This system will
increase the range at which Indian warships can engage adversaries.
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In the final analysis, however, the passage of shipping would be faced
with superior airpower and, unless assisted by the Indian Air Force or luck,
would be very unlikely to be accomplished successfully.
2. Amphibious Landing
The Indian Navy's lack of lift capacity and expertise in amphibious
operations would be intensified in an opposed amphibious landing. The lack
of effective gunfire support capabilities or doctrine would seem to make the
seizure and defense of a beachhead difficult to impossible. Amphibious ships
would be vulnerable to the same types of attack as shipping formations
outlined previously.
The only likely scenario for success is one where significant numbers
of IAF and naval air assets are devoted to close air support, and amphibious
troops are put ashore under the protection of these assets. Against a
determined adversary, however, opposed amphibious operations have little
chance for success. One retired Indian admiral supported this view, asserting
that "... at present it is not possible for the Indian naval forces to put across a
brigade in a situation of opposition and sustain it over a period of time, let
alone enlarge the bridgehead" (Roy, February 1990, p. 1145).
3. Shore Bombardment
Although often associated in Western navies as being a supporting
activity for amphibious operations, shore bombardment can also be an
operation in its own right. The Pakistani SAG raids against India and the
1971 Indian strikes at Karachi are indicative of shore bombardment being
conducted as an independent operation. The primary method that the Indian
Navy would employ for shore bombardment operations would be air strikes
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from carrier-based aircraft. The effectiveness of carrier air strikes was
demonstrated to the Indian Navy by the 1971 raids against East Pakistan. The
"iron bomb" capability of the Sea Harrier would be effective against shore
installations, although the lack of standoff weaponry could contribute to high
attrition from AAA and SAM defenses.
In addition to the naval aviation forces, the surface combatant force
possesses a moderate shore bombardment capability. Although lacking the
numbers and weight for effective NGFS, the gun systems and missile systems
of the surface fleet could be effective in strikes against ports, oil installations
and other shore targets. This was also illustrated to the Indian Navy in the
1971 raid on Karachi. The success of this type of operation would depend on
air cover or surprise (i.e. the Karachi raid).
The shore bombardment mission is the only sea use operation that
the Indian surface force is currently technically capable of conducting with a
high level of confidence. The primary weaknesses associated with this type of
operation are lack of early detection and adequate air defense capabilities. The
proximity of the likely operating areas of the Indian fleet to potential
adversaries, however, make these weaknesses definite "show stoppers."
4. Denial of Passage
The first of the sea denial operations discussed by Hill is denial of
passage. Hill defines these operations as those undertaken to deny an
adversary the use of the sea for passage of shipping. According to Hill, denial
of passage operations are of growing utility in an era where "... the means of
attack are often more cost-effective than the means of protection ..." (Hill,
1986, p. 141).
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The Indian surface fleet has a strong capability to accomplish this type
of operation. Virtually all of the surface force has some degree of capability to
interdict maritime and naval traffic transiting a conflict zone. The naval
aviation assets, both Sea Harriers and helicopters, equipped with Sea Eagle
ASMs have an effective standoff maritime strike capability. The air assets are
augmented by the SSM capabilities of the majority of surface warships. The
SS-N-2 STYX missile, the primary ASUW weapon of the surface fleet, can
engage targets at ranges up to 45 miles. The Indian warships without ASM
capability, such as the Pauk II and Petya II classes, have the speed and gun
capability to engage merchant vessels, particularly those transiting choke
points or areas near Indian territory. Additionally, many of the Soviet SAM
systems deployed on Indian warships have a secondary ASUW capability.
These AAW missiles lack the range and warhead size to be effective against
naval forces, but have an effective capability against maritime assets.
The denial of passage operations are those for which the Indian
surface force is ideally suited. The amount of firepower that can be delivered,
along with the almost perfect geographic position of India near regional sea
lanes, make the task of protecting shipping from Indian attack exceedingly
difficult. As one Indian writer asserted, discussing the 1971 war, the concept
of sea denial was "... indelibly etched into India's naval consciousness" (Tellis,
Part 1 1990, p. 85).
5. Denial of Sea Areas
Hill's concept of denial of sea areas is often referred to as "sea control"
by naval strategists. Hill asserts that this type of operation approximates a
classical exercise of sea power and is usually the prerogative of the stronger
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side in a conflict (Hill, 1986, p. 141). This concept has been articulated by many
Indian naval writers, one of whom states that "... sea control in specified areas
of interest in the Indian Ocean ..." is a primary objective of the Indian Navy
(Prakash, 1990, p. 62).
The geographical position of India is an aid and a detriment to
attaining sea control. In the Bay of Bengal area, the port of Vishakhapatnam
allows surface forces direct access to their operating areas. The regional
navies bordering the Bay of Bengal are relatively weak and could be rapidly
neutralized by the Indian surface fleet, given sufficient IAF support. Stronger
navies, such as those of Indonesia and Malaysia, are subject to decimation as
they attempt to transit the Malacca Straits, which are dominated by Port Blair
and other installations at the entrance into the Bay of Bengal. The situation
in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean is different, however. These areas offer
a variety of routes of travel and are significantly larger areas of ocean over
which to attempt to exercise dominance. India's traditional naval threat,
Pakistan, has only one port (Karachi) which lessens the Indian problem of
locating an enemy force in order to destroy it. The drawback, however, is that
the close location to India of Karachi allows the Pakistani Air Force to provide
air cover for the Pakistani fleet. This air cover would have to be neutralized
before the Indian Navy could exert any real measure of sea control over the
Arabian Sea. In the Indian Ocean itself, the areas involved are too great to
allow the Indian navy to exert sea control except in the areas immediately
adjacent to an Indian battle group.
A traditional "fleet vs. fleet" engagement is an unlikely occurrence in
the Indian Ocean region. The regional geography and the sophistication of
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littoral air forces ensure that most naval actions will be combined arms
operations. If the Indian surface fleet did engage in combat with any regional
navy, without the involvement of land-based air, the numbers and firepower
of the Indian force will have the advantage. Currently, although having a
surprise attack capability, the Indian surface force would have little chance of
defeating a modern Western navy.
D. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE INDIAN SURFACE FORCE
A summary of the capability of the Indian surface fleet in various
categories of Hill's model is provided in Table XVI. The force has moderate
to high capability in most of the normal conditions and low intensity
operations categories. When higher level operations are attempted, however,
significant weaknesses are evident.










Demonstration of Right X
Demonstration of Resolve X
Invited Amphibious Landing X
Evacuation of Nationals X
Protection of Offshore Installations X
Passage of Shipping Against Opposition X
Opposed Amphibious Landing X
Denial of Passage X
Denial of Sea Areas X
Fleet Engagement X
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limit its range, end
weaknesses are:
• Lack of AEW
• Lack of suffic
Lack of effective surface AAW missile system capability
Lack of sufficient amphibious lift capability and specialized troops for
amphibious operations
Lack of adequate numbers of combat logistics vessels
Lack of naval gunfire support capability
Limited indigenous capability to produce naval weaponry
Although not discussed previously, two additional areas of concern
have manifested themselves in the last year. In India, several Indian Navy
admirals quarreled in public about the professional competence of fellow
officers. Additionally, there was a public lobbying contest between admirals
competing for the position of Chief of Naval Staff (Sharpe, 1991, p. 57).
Whether these are isolated incidents or signs of leadership problems remains
to be seen.
The strengths and weaknesses of the Indian surface force have had a
significant impact on Indian naval strategy. This strategy, along with
indications to determine its future course, are presented in the following
chapter.
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VI. ROLE OF INDIAN SURFACE FORCE IN CURRENT AND PROJECTED
NAVAL STRATEGY
The current strategy of the Indian Navy is not easily discerned from open
source official government statements. No official government position,
such as the British Defence White Paper, has been promulgated delineating
India's naval goals and aims. Analysis of India's naval literature, however,
along with the statements of senior Indian naval officers does produce useful
insights into current and future Indian naval strategy and the role of the
surface fleet in that strategy.
A. CURRENT INDIAN NAVAL STRATEGY
Although phrased in different ways by various authors, the current
Indian naval strategy can be summarized as follows:
• To exercise sea control in specified areas of interest in the Indian Ocean.
• To ensure freedom of navigation and security of SLOCs.
• To safeguard interests in contiguous waters, EEZ and island territories.
• To maintain limited power projection capability.
• Deterrence and monitoring of extra-regional navies.
In each of these areas, the Indian surface fleet plays a crucial role.
1. Sea Control in Specified Areas
During its early development, the Indian Navy was a defensive force
that emphasized coastal defense and sea denial. In the late 1970s, the concept
of sea control began to be advocated in the Indian naval literature. As a
former Chief of Naval Staff stated in 1978, "... During war, effective sea
control is of paramount importance" (Kohli, 1978, p. 109). This view became
82
more prevalent in subsequent years. As one Indian naval expert explained
"... the Navy's original local sea control and shore defense orientation, which
largely emphasized preserving the integrity of India's coastal waters against a
Pakistani threat, has given way to a wider assertive naval orientation,
including both complete peninsular sea control and preservation of extra-
peninsular zones of influence in an all purpose conception now labelled
'defense of the nation's maritime interests'" (Tellis, Part I 1990, p. 87). This
view is supported by a statement made by the Indian Chief of Naval Staff, at
the commissioning of INS Viraat in 1988, declaring that the acquisition of the
Viraat marked the beginning of a true "blue-water" capability for the Indian
Navy and was in keeping with a new doctrine of sea control vice sea denial
(Grant, 1989, p. 269).
As discussed previously, achievement of total sea control by the
Indian Navy would be difficult to accomplish given the regional air and
missile threat. The term "specified areas of interest" suggests either sea
control operations in conjunction with the Indian Air Force or, more likely,
operations conducted in areas near or beyond the maximum range of regional
land-based air.
In open ocean situations against non-major power navies, the Indian
surface force could exert a fair degree of sea control. To accomplish this one
Indian naval officer wrote, it is necessary to ensure "... the domination of the
airspace above and the capability to sanitize the depth below any part of the
ocean which may be of interest at a given time." (Prakash, 1990, p. 63). In the
absence of hostile land-based air, the Indian Sea Harriers with good AAW and
ASUW weapons could strike naval vessels prior to ASM launch and could
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eliminate surveillance assets deployed against Indian battle groups. In the
anti-submarine arena, although open ocean ASW is inherently difficult, the
number of ASW helicopters and ASW-capable surface vessels in the Indian
fleet suggest a dedicated effort to protect the battle groups from submarine
attack. These capabilities notwithstanding, if either land-based air assets or
major navies are present, effective sea control of any open ocean area by the
Indian fleet is unlikely. Sea control could be achieved to a degree in waters
close to India where large numbers of IAF assets may be brought to bear.
2. Freedom of Navigation and SLOC Security
The Indian naval goals of freedom of navigation and SLOC security
both require the prevention of SLOC interdiction by a hostile power. In
conflicts with regional powers, the Indian surface force has the capability to
accomplish this goal. The continued addition of numerous ASUW
platforms, along with the establishment of bases in key locations, provide the
Indian surface fleet with a strong capability to ensure that the regional SLOCs
remain open in a future conflict.
3. Safeguard EEZ and Island Territories
This component of Indian naval strategy has been the subject of
many articles in the unclassified literature. The protection of the EEZ has
become a matter of increased concern for India as more quantities of oil and
valuable minerals have been exploited in India's EEZ. Currently, over 50% of
India's oil and 80% of its natural gas requirements are obtained from EEZ
assets (Singh, 1991, p. 75). Although a primary mission of the Indian coast
guard, the vast area of India's EEZ and the sophistication of regional navies
have resulted in a commitment by the Indian Navy, through the use of land-
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based surveillance aircraft and surface vessels, to protect India's EEZ from
hostile interventions.
The protection of island territories is a key concern of the Indian
Navy, given the strategic locations and extended distances from the mainland
of many of India's island groups. The modernization and expansion of
facilities in the Andaman, Nicobar and Laccadive island groups and the
basing of additional surface vessels in these island groups are evidence of the
importance of this mission to the Indian Navy.
4. Maintenance of Limited Power Projection Capability
Power projection has been defined by one Indian naval writer as
"... amphibious capability and ability to sustain a naval task force in distant
waters." (Singh, 1989, p. 57). By this definition, current Indian power
projection capability is definitely limited. As discussed previously, the
amphibious and logistics capabilities of the Indian Navy are marginal at best.
The Indian surface fleet can support limited power projection operations such
as protection of island territories and amphibious landings by invitation.
Extended or opposed operations, however, are not currently feasible. There is
a strong belief among the Indian naval leadership that a power projection
capability is required in order to ensure the security of Indian ethnic
communities residing in island nations such as the Maldives, Mauritius and
the Seychelles (Harrison, 1989, p. 262). This justification, along with the need
to protect India's island territories, is a key factor behind the developing
amphibious capabilities of the Indian surface fleet.
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5. Deterrence and Monitoring of Extra-regional Navies
The naval missions of deterrence and monitoring of extra-regional
navies are recurrent themes in Indian naval literature and statements. These
two areas of concern are closely related and are the result of an almost
paranoic obsession by India not to be humiliated by foreign navies, as
occurred when the USS Enterprise was deployed to the Bay of Bengal in 1971.
Deterrence is often expressed as a major peacetime mission for the Indian
Navy. A former Indian Chief of Staff stated that "Looking generally at the
Navy's peacetime functions, we find that its primary one is deterrence"
(Sojka, 1983, p. 6). Deterrence is also supportive of the monitoring of the
extra-regional navies. This is illustrated by the view of the then Chief of
Naval Staff who, in 1986, asserted "The Indian Navy cannot expect to prevail
against the punch a super power can bring to bear. But we can raise the costs
of its intervention. That is what deterrence is all about." (Indian Military
Yearbook, 1987, p. 109). The emphasis on this mission in the Indian naval
literature is indicative of the suspicion and hostility with which India views
foreign naval deployments in the region.
The developing capabilities of the Indian surface force would
definitely "raise the costs" of outside intervention in the region. As for
regional threats, the current force levels and capabilities of the Indian Navy
are a credible deterrent to regional nations considering employing naval
forces against India.
B. FUTURE INDIAN NAVAL STRATEGY
The future nature of Indian naval strategy is of major concern to regional
and extra-regional nations alike. Anxiety over the naval intentions of India
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has led several nations in the region to begin naval modernization programs
in an attempt to lessen India's naval dominance. Indonesia, for example,
although not considered a traditional enemy of India, has begun construction
of a new naval base and is in the process of acquiring 24 frigates as a response
to India's naval expansion (Nugent, 1991, p. 36). Although future Indian
naval strategy is difficult to predict, the political support in India and the
views of Indian naval officials support the conclusion that the Indian Navy
will continue to develop and play an important role in Indian national
policy.
1. Political Support for Naval Development
The Indian political system, although democratic, is characterized by
violence, confusion and intense ethnic rivalries. It is surprising that a
coherent national security policy can result from this political system. Since
the late 1960s, however, a constant policy of nonalignment and naval
modernization and expansion has been pursued by New Delhi. Another
constant factor has been the support for the Navy articulated by every Indian
prime minister over the past 20 years. This was illustrated in the 1980s by
Rajiv Gandhi. His view that 'The defense of India requires our undisputed
mastery over the approaches to India by the sea ..." (Nugent, 1991, p. 29) was
representative of the support that the Indian Navy has enjoyed in recent
years from the political leadership. The intervention in Sri Lanka and the
Maldives indicated an Indian political willingness to be the regional
"policeman"—a manifestation of the unofficial "Rajiv Doctrine" (Nugent,
1991, p. 29). The consistent support and naval expansion over the past 20
years, despite internal political conflicts, along with steady real-term funding
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increases, suggest a solid base of support for Indian naval growth that will
continue in the future.
2. Naval Views of Future Naval Strategy
Not surprisingly, the Indian naval literature is strongly supportive of
continued naval expansion. The Indian Navy sees itself as the "front line"
against a perceived threat of foreign maritime interventionism. The future
Indian naval strategy will probably feature the same components as the
current strategy. There are mixed views in the Indian Navy and the region,
however, on whether the attainment of these goals will be accomplished by
an offensive or defensive naval orientation.
The current Indian Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral L. Ramdas, added to
the confusion in June 1991. Ramdas criticized his predecessors for
emphasizing "small ship" procurement, asserting that smaller ships were
excessively cost-intensive in terms of maintenance and infrastructure and
that the Indian Navy now has a goal of attaining a 60:40 ratio in favor of
larger ships (presumably destroyer-size and larger) in the next 10-15 years.
This policy implies a move toward large displacement vessels that have
greater range and are potentially more offensive in nature. In the same
interview, however, Ramdas suggested that India may have to enter into
regional security arrangements to meet national security needs (APDR-
Newsletter, June 1991, p. 25). This suggests a more defensive naval
orientation, at least for some scenarios. In addition to apparently conflicting
statements from the Indian naval leadership, concern about future Indian
naval intentions is aggravated by a large number of belligerent statements by
Indian naval officers in the naval literature. Statements such as "The surest
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way to maintain peace is to occupy a position of menace" (Agashe, 1990, p. 14)
are not indicative of a "kinder, gentler" Indian Navy and serve to fuel
regional mistrust and suspicion.
The justifications for an expanded Indian Navy also add to regional
confusion about India's motives. The rationale behind India's naval
expansion is often expressed in amorphous terms that have little apparent
validity. The primary naval threats to India, when they are articulated, are
considered to be China and Pakistan. These threats, although perhaps
credible to the Indian naval leadership, are apparently over-stated. The naval
balance of power between India and Pakistan in terms of numbers of
combatants, firepower, flexibility and infrastructure is clearly in India's favor.
The single Pakistani port of Karachi could be neutralized relatively easily by
Indian naval and air assets. The notion that the Pakistani Navy has the
capability to coerce India is not credible and provides little justification for a
multi-carrier navy. The Chinese Navy, although greater in numbers than the
Indian Navy, is essentially a coastal force and has shown little capability or
desire to influence events in the Indian Ocean. A former Indian admiral
admitted that "China's present capabilities do not allow a naval power
projection into the Indian Ocean" (Awati, 1989, p. 109). Additionally, a PRC
naval task force would be subject to serious casualties as it attempted to transit
the Malacca Straits. As in the case of the Pakistani Navy, the Chinese naval
"threat" to India is minimal at best and appears to lack credibility as an
argument for an extensively expanded Indian naval force.
Whether the future Indian naval strategy is offensive or defensive in
nature, it is apparent that there is a growing appreciation in the Indian Navy
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of the diplomatic roles that a navy can play. The support that a strong navy
can give to diplomatic maneuvers is another argument for a capable and
modern naval force. As one Indian writer stated, the "... ability to employ the
use of force at sea will have an impact on the success or failure of diplomacy"
(Tahliani, 1981, p. 225). This appreciation of the Indian Navy's diplomatic
role is widely held in the naval leadership and suggests that naval "saber
rattling" may be a component of future Indian naval strategy and that the
Indian surface force will play a key role in that strategy.
C INDICATORS OF THE NATURE OF FUTURE INDIAN NAVAL
STRATEGY
The future nature of Indian naval strategy is difficult to predict. There
are, however, a number of intelligence indicators which can serve to
illustrate whether the Indian surface fleet and naval strategy will be oriented
towards offensive or defensive objectives.
1. Indicators of Offensive Naval Strategy
Forward naval operations can be conducted for offensive and
defensive purposes. The U.S. Navy, for example, has long pursued a policy of
forward defense—a policy viewed, at least by the U.S., as not offensive in
nature. The difference between a forward offensive posture and a forward
defensive posture, however, can be murky in the absence of an articulated
naval strategy. The validity of a forward defensive posture is often dependent
on the geographic situation of a nation and potential adversaries. In India's
case, the fact that most regional SLOCs and chokepoints are close to Indian
zones of influence would suggest that a forward posture is unnecessary.
Future naval adversaries are forced by geography to a few avenues of
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approach that are subject to domination by Indian naval and air forces. In the
absence of a clear, official naval strategy, an Indian embrace of a forward
posture for defensive purposes seems unlikely. Rather, a forward naval
posture by India, along with recent historical experience, suggests an offensive
strategy to exert influence on the Indian Ocean region. This philosophy,
although not officially stated, has been echoed in the Indian naval and
general literature—a philosophy that "... Indian Ocean control is India's
future" (JPRS, 1989, p. 73).
Although not individually indicative of an offensive orientation, the
following developments, should they occur, viewed as a group could be the
result of an offensive naval strategy.
• Acquisition of a CTOL aircraft carrier
• Expansion of fleet logistics capability
• Acquisition of organic AEW aircraft
• Acquisition of mid-air refueling capability
• Formation of a southern fleet
• Expansion of amphibious lift capability and marine brigade
• Increase in force totals relative to regional navies
• Increase in out-of-area deployments and exercises
• Development of significant AAW warships
• Maintenance of or increase in existing naval funding levels despite
financial hardships
The acquisition of a conventional aircraft carrier with sophisticated
strike and fleet air defense aircraft could be a major indication that India is
moving toward a more proactive and offensive naval orientation. There are
currently conflicting accounts in the literature as to the nature of the carrier
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planned to be built at Cochin. CTOL, V/STOL and hybrid configurations have
each been suggested. If a CTOL carrier does become part of the Indian surface
fleet, the strike capability, range and self-defense capability of such a vessel
could have a serious impact upon the regional balance of naval power.
An improved and modernized logistics capability is essential if the
Indian surface fleet plans to conduct offensive operations at extended
distances from India. There have been statements by Indian naval leaders
suggesting that this may be a future goal. As the then Indian Chief of Naval
Staff, Admiral J. Nadkarni, stated in 1988, "It is important for the Indian Navy
to have large ocean-going ships with good firepower and endurance"
(Nadkarni, 1989, p. 56). He added that the Indian Navy should have the
capability to operate at distances in excess of 2000 kilometers from India. In
view of these statements, the current replenishment vessel construction
program, along with the two CLF ships currently in the fleet, will contribute
greatly to increasing the range, endurance and sustainability of the Indian
fleet.
A current weakness of the Indian surface fleet is a lack of organic
AEW capability. Timely warning and location information is essential if a
fleet is to conduct successful forward operations outside of the protection of
land-based aircraft. As an Indian naval officer stated in 1990, "Lack of
airborne early warning (AEW) support at sea is clearly a gap which needs to be
filled by the navy to make its carriers more effective and to provide a safer
environment for its surface forces" (Prakash, 1990, p. 69). The probable short-
term solution to this problem will be the acquisition of AEW helicopters. In
1989 the Chief of Naval Staff confirmed that negotiations were in progress to
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acquire AEW helicopters (Nadkarni, 1991, p. 55). As of 1991, five Sea King Mk
42D AEW variants have been purchased, with up to nine additional units on
order. (Sharpe, 1991, p. 269) It is unknown if these aircraft are as yet
operational. Of added interest, the Indian Air Force flew an indigenous AEW
prototype, resembling an E-2C, in November 1990 (APDR-Newsletter,
February 1991, p. 24). It is unknown if a naval variant of this aircraft is
planned. The detection and processing capabilities of AEW aircraft cause
them to be expensive assets. The deployment of AEW helicopters or aircraft
by the Indian Navy would be indicative of a desire to conduct forward
operations in a hostile environment.
An additional requirement for effective naval strike and air defense
operations is mid-air refueling capability. This capability allows air strikes
from greater distances and more effective use of air defense aircraft—both
factors contributing directly to improved survivability for aircraft carriers
operating in hostile areas. Currently, neither the Indian Navy nor Indian Air
Force have mid-air refueling capability (Samaddar, 1991, p. 5). Although no
information is currently available on programs to rectify this shortcoming,
mid-air refueling capability will be essential if the Indian surface force plans
to pursue an offensive strategy.
The formation of a new Southern Fleet at Cochin would greatly
enhance the offensive capability of the Indian surface fleet. The formation of
such a fleet would provide the C-in-C, Southern Naval Command, with his
own naval forces and will cause that command to become an important
operational player in addition to overseeing naval training. A fleet based at
Cochin would be closer to Indian Ocean operating areas and would be difficult
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for regional navies to interdict. Such a fleet would also allow more dispersal
of Indian naval assets, making preemptive strikes more difficult (an Indian
version of "strategic homeporting"). Although the establishment of this fleet
has not been announced or confirmed, there has been some discussion in the
naval literature about the role of a future Southern Fleet. One Indian naval
writer stated that, while the Eastern and Western fleets would be responsible
for defending India and the EEZ, the Southern Fleet would be "... primarily
responsible for safeguarding India's interests further afield" (Birla, 1985, p.
194). This open-ended statement was supported by the assertion that even
four aircraft carriers would not be sufficient for the Indian Navy if a third
fleet came into existence. It is not certain that a Southern Fleet will be
formed. The two existing fleets have a great deal of authority and autonomy
and it is unlikely that those commands will willingly give up assets and
prestige to a new "strike" fleet. If a third fleet is formed, however, it will be
another indication that India is considering a more offensive naval strategy
or that Indian military strategy is considering implementation of a more
offensive naval component.
Expanded amphibious lift capability and additional amphibious
troops are required if the Indian Navy plans to conduct offensive power
projection operations. One Indian naval expert has asserted that "... at least
three independently deployable brigades, each possessing its own organic
strike aviation, fire support capability, command elements, and requisite
beachhead and onshore mobility elements" (Tellis, Part I 1990, p. 95) are
required in order to conduct offensive operations. Although that level of
capability is in the distant future, the current amphibious vessel construction
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programs indicate that the Indian Navy is committed to increasing its
amphibious lift capability. The proposed establishment of a second marine
brigade is indicative that the naval leadership desires to have the future
option of conducting power projection operations.
The advantage in numbers that the Indian Navy enjoys over regional
nations is already substantial and, given current naval construction
programs, will continue for many years. While "bean-counting" alone
cannot measure the capabilities of a naval force, in many cases quantity has a
quality all of its own. The addition of modern, capable surface combatants
without any succinct official rationale will be an indicator that the Indian
leadership may be pursuing a more offensive naval strategy.
A professional navy prefers to operate as much as possible in areas in
which it may have to operate in a future conflict. For much of its existence,
the Indian surface fleet has operated primarily in the Arabian Sea and Bay of
Bengal. In recent years however, a number of Indian warships have operated
in areas that are great distances from India itself. Although these
deployments have been predominantly good will visits, any future conduct of
open ocean exercises in areas such as the South China Sea or southern Indian
Ocean could indicate peacetime preparations for a forward wartime naval
strategy. Additionally, the acquisition of extra-regional bases to support these
operations could indicate a potentially offensive strategy. Some reports have
indicated an Indian interest in leasing Cam Ranh Bay. Such a development,
if it transpired, could signify an Indian desire to provide support for offensive
operations (Kassim, 1990, p. 108).
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The Indian surface fleet is currently extremely vulnerable to air attack
from regional air forces. This weakness is a matter of great concern if the
Indian Navy plans future offensive power projection operations. One Indian
writer observed that the Falklands conflict had demonstrated the need for
"... integrated air cover for a fleet in distant operations" (Awati, 1989, p. 107)
Large AAW ships with long-range SAM systems will be essential if the Indian
surface fleet is to survive in an adversary's territorial waters. Development of
a long-range SAM system (similar to TARTAR or TERRIER), along with the
addition of large warships with significant magazine capacities, could be
indicative of a more offensive naval strategy.
Continued high levels of funding in the Indian Navy's budget share
would also support a commitment to purchasing the numbers of vessels
necessary to support offensive operations. Although, since 1971, the Indian
defense budget has remained at an almost constant 3.5% of GNP (of which the
Navy's share is approximately 13.5%), the Indian GNP has grown significantly
since 1978. This has resulted in a steady rise in real terms of defense
allocations (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1990). India's
worsening budget deficit situation, however, makes future naval funding
increases an uncertain proposition. Some politicians have stated that the
heretofore defense establishment "sacred cow" must be sacrificed in order to
solve current fiscal problems (McDonald, 1991, p. 34). Indian naval strategy of
any orientation will be meaningless unless sufficient funds are allocated to
procure assets to execute that strategy. Continued funding of capital-intensive
large warships of increasing sophistication, in the face of financial problems,
would indicate a national commitment to a strong Indian Navy and a desire
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to maintain a fleet capable of offensive operations rather than a less-
expensive defensive force. Recent rhetoric and past funding trends lead to
the conclusion that a national commitment to a strong naval force exists.
All of the aforementioned indicators would support an offensive,
power projection Indian naval strategy. The expanding power projection
capability of India's current naval development program is apparently what is
causing the most concern among regional nations. As one writer noted
"... India's current force development proposals, which emphasize naval
power projection capabilities, do appear to exceed the demands of India's
national self-defence" (Behm, 1990, p. 16). If India desires to change its
belligerent image, it must take concrete steps to indicate that it is pursuing a
defensive naval strategy.
2. Indications of a Defensive Naval Strategy
Although many of India's current naval programs support a future
offensive strategy, there are several indications that could serve to ease
regional fears about India's naval expansion. These indications include:
Retention of V/STOL aircraft carrier option
Maintenance of defensive amphibious capability
Procurement of short-range ASCM-capable warships vice large
displacement, high endurance vessels
Retention of existing fleet structure
Reasonable logistic support capability
Continuation of local exercises
Official articulation of defensive naval objectives
The most dramatic tangible indication that the Indian Navy is
pursuing a defensive naval strategy would be the retention of the V/STOL
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carrier option. Considerably less expensive than conventional carrier and
with significant power projection limitations, the V/STOL carriers of the
Indian fleet are, to a large degree, inherently defensive in nature. Future
acquisitions of this type of warship would help alleviate regional fears that a
naval "Pax lndica" is a priority for the Indian leadership.
The maintenance of a moderate amphibious capability suited for
defensive purposes would be another indication of a defensively oriented
Indian naval strategy. An amphibious force capable of deploying one or two
brigade-sized elements would support Indian naval goals of protecting its
island territories or evacuating nationals in a crisis. Limiting the amphibious
force to this size would contribute to lessening regional concerns about India's
power projection intentions.
The procurement of relatively inexpensive, short-range ASW and
ASUW vessels would support a defensive naval strategy. The geographic
advantages that India enjoys Would allow corvette and frigate-size vessels, in
conjunction with land-based maritime air assets, to adequately defend India's
vital interests. The modern weaponry and excellent basing locations
available to the Indian fleet would allow these types of vessels to provide a
strong deterrent against extra-regional intervention, as well as a more than
adequate defense against other regional navies.
The maintenance of the existing two-fleet structure of the Indian
Navy would be another indication that India is pursuing a defensive naval
strategy. The existing fleets are ideally situated to defend the main avenues of
approach to India. This structure, along with forces in the island groups,
makes strategic sense and supports a strong naval defense of India. A
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decision against the addition of a third fleet would contribute greatly to
avoiding perceived provocation and consequent regional tension.
The maintenance of the logistic force at reasonable levels would be
another indication of a defensive Indian naval strategy. The offensive
capability of naval vessels is meaningless unless those ships can be sustained
with "beans, bombs and bullets" in the combat zone. The current Indian
logistics force is indicative of a defensive strategy. If additional vessels are
added at regular intervals only to replace aging vessels, the Indian surface
fleet will not develop sufficient forward support capability to engage in
sustained offensive operations.
The routine fleet exercises currently conducted by the Indian Navy in
local waters are indicative of a defensive orientation. If this trend continues,
the Indian fleet will not be well-prepared to conduct offensive out-of-area
operations and will support the statements of the naval leadership that
defense of India is still the primary goal of Indian naval strategy.
The simplest and most significant action that the Indian government
could take to assure the region that its naval goals are defensive would be the
publication of an official position paper outlining the rationale behind Indian
naval development. The current lack of an articulated strategy has been cited
by numerous regional writers and officials as a major cause of distrust about
India's motives. A coherent statement of naval policy could contribute
greatly toward reducing the threatening image of the Indian Navy in the
view of other regional nations.
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3. Summary
Although offensive and defensive indications have been presented, it
is difficult to categorize navies as only offensive or defensive in nature.
Naval vessels are flexible instruments of national power, and many are
suited for a variety of roles, offensive and defensive. To determine the
nature of a nation's national strategy, an observer must take into account the
motivations and aspirations of the national leadership as well as the force
structure and character of the naval forces.
The Indian surface fleet, traditionally defensively oriented, is
developing the capabilities to become an offensive power projection force.
The construction programs and literary evidence strongly suggest a desire of
the Indian naval leadership to improve the capabilities of the fleet to a degree
far beyond that sufficient for defensive purposes. The majority of offensive
intelligence indications are in the processing of being manifested. The claim
by Indian officials that an expanded Navy is needed to conduct coast guard
type duties is contradicted by the fact that the Indian Coast Guard is also in the
process of major expansion and modernization. In the absence of a credible
threat, a major influence on the Indian naval leadership appears to be the
belief that a superior navy is essential for India's national pride. An Indian
defense analyst explained that "Navies are symbols of power. We want to be
a world-class power, so we must have a world-class navy" (Nugent, 1991, p.
30). Although difficult to quantify, these nationalistic aspects of Indian naval
expansion are worth considering, along with force structure and capabilities.
The desire for respect and treatment as a great power are recurrent themes in
the Indian literature. Whatever the motivation, it is becoming readily
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apparent that the Indian Navy, and especially the surface fleet, has sufficient
capability for defensive purposes and, therefore, the aggressive rhetoric and
ongoing programs suggest more ambitious objectives.
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VII. REGIONAL REACTIONS TO INDIAN NAVAL EXPANSION AND
IMPLICATIONS OF EXPANSION FOR THE U.S.
A. REGIONAL REACTIONS
The dramatic expansion of Indian naval power, without any readily
apparent justification, has caused significant concern among India's regional
neighbors. The prevailing view seems to be that the momentum of India's
naval expansion may cause new rationale for the employment of naval force
to be developed by Indian in order to take advantage of its emerging
capabilities (Cheung, 1989, p. 19).
Pakistani reaction to India's naval expansion, predictably, has been one of
alarm and has led to attempts to improve the capabilities of the Pakistani
Navy. The U.S. has traditionally been Pakistan's major naval arms supplier
and has contributed significantly to an improved, although still small,
Pakistani naval force. HARPOON-capable P-3C aircraft, PHALANX CPvVS
systems and Garcia and Brooke class frigates are examples of U.S. systems that
have added significant capability to the Pakistani Navy. Whether this
relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan will continue remains to be seen,
especially in light of recent developments associated with the Pressler
amendment. It is clear, however, that the Indian Navy remains the primary
naval threat to Pakistan and that the continued acquisition of modern
systems to counter that threat will be a priority for the Pakistani naval
leadership.
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China, another traditional enemy of India, is also expanding its navy.
This expansion, however, is not a direct result of Indian naval developments.
The Chinese Navy remains a defensive, coastal force and has expressed little
real desire for a "blue-water" capability (Preston, 1989, p. 78). The major goal
of the PRC Navy is to exert some degree of control in the South China Sea.
The developing PRC Navy does have a regional impact, however. India has
repeatedly cited Chinese naval developments as a major reason for its own
naval expansion and other regional actors have expressed misgivings about
Chinese, as well as Indian, naval developments (Cheung, 1989, p. 18).
The most vigorous expressions of concern regarding India's naval
expansion have been expressed by smaller nations in the region. The ASEAN
nations (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) have
expressed doubts about the need for a powerful Indian Navy and have
questioned the intent behind current Indian naval developments. Malaysia's
defense minister echoed this concern in 1990, stating his fear that the Indian
Navy's development into a blue-water force could tempt India to attempt to
exert control beyond the Indian Ocean, such as in the Malacca Straits
(Hussain, 1990, p. 20). Other officials have declared that the unstable situation
caused by India's naval expansion "... has made every Southeast Asian
country aware that it should have its own defense capability" (FBIS, 22
February 1990, p. 41). The emphasis of the ASEAN states, given their limited
resources, has been on coordinated naval planning and operations. These
activities have usually been conducted through bilateral, rather than
multilateral, ties as a result of regional sensitivities. Although the regional
nations have not yet formed a formal defense alliance, it is clear that the
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Indian naval expansion, and, to a lesser degree, the development of Chinese
and Japanese naval power, has contributed to an increased sense of
uncertainty and concern in the Indian Ocean littoral and Southeast Asian
regions (Cheung, 1989, p. 16).
The regional uncertainty caused by developing Indian naval power has
resulted in a strong expression in the literature that the U.S. should continue
to maintain a presence in the region. Several officials have stated that U.S.
presence is desired to prevent a power vacuum that India may attempt to fill
(FBIS, 13 March 1990, p. 34). The changing regional balance of power resulting
from U.S. force level reductions and reduced Soviet naval presence, as well as
developing Indian naval capabilities, is of great concern to regional nations
and is a problem that should be addressed by U.S. policy makers.
B. IMPLICATIONS OF INDIAN NAVAL EXPANSION FOR THE U.S.
The security and stability of the Indian Ocean region and its effect on the
western Pacific region have long been of strategic significance to the U.S. It
follows that the emergence of a modern Indian surface force with the
apparent goal of attaining power projection capability is also of strategic
significance to the U.S. To avoid misjudgement, decision makers should
consider the capabilities of the Indian surface force in both adversarial and
allied roles.
1. Capabilities of Indian Surface Force in Adversarial Role
The superior capabilities of the Indian surface force vis-a-vis regional
navies and its ability to operate from bases in close proximity to regional
SLOCs could potentially affect U.S. and allied interests in the event of a future
crisis. Although U.S. interests seem unlikely to be deliberately attacked by
104
Indian naval forces, the possibility exists that U.S. and Indian forces may
encounter each other in one of the following scenarios:
• Accidental attack incidental to regional tension (i.e. USS Stark)
• U.S. intervention to prevent dismemberment of friendly nation
engaged in losing conflict with India
• U.S. intervention to protect SLOCs during regional conflict (i.e. Indian
vs. Pakistan or the PRC)
While the Indian surface fleet does not have the capability to defeat a
major U.S. naval force, regional hostilities involving Indian naval forces
could endanger smaller naval groups and maritime traffic, particularly if
hostilities come about with little warning or were the result of accidental
engagements. Although the traditional U.S. carrier battle group (CVBG)
would be relatively invulnerable, hostilities could potentially endanger
smaller surface action groups (SAG) and amphibious forces that will become
more commonplace under the new U.S. defense strategy. The smaller missile
combatants of the Indian fleet could pose a threat close to India's coastline;
the primary risk to U.S. interests, however, would come from Indian power
projection assets-CVBGs, SAGs, and, to a lesser degree, amphibious forces.
(NOTE: Although not addressed in this study, the 19 diesel submarines of the
Indian Navy would also be a major threat to U.S. forces in the region.)
a. CVBG Potential Threat
The primary offensive capability of the Indian surface fleet is
centered around the two aircraft carriers. Their Sea Harriers can strike naval
targets at distances of up to 250 nautical miles employing conventional
bombs, rockets and SEA EAGLE ASMs. Both carriers also employ ASM-
capable Sea King helicopters with a range of 300 nautical miles. Although
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these systems would pose a minimal threat against alerted U.S. warships, they
do provide an excellent strike capability against merchant shipping and
unalerted naval vessels.
The Indian concept of CVBG composition differs significantly
from that of the U.S. Rather than deploying a heavy screen of escorts around
the carriers, the Indian naval leadership feels that "Aircraft carriers can and
must operate singly in smaller navies with one or two attendant destroyers,
tactically maintaining a high speed of advance ..." (Roy, March 1990, p. 73).
This philosophy, although possibly arising from the heretofore lack of
sufficient numbers of escort vessels, suggests that the carrier escorts must
have multiple mission capabilities if they are to adequately protect the
carriers. The best candidates in the current Indian naval inventory for the
escort role appear to be the Kashin II class destroyers (and PROJECT 15 ships
when they become available) and the Godavari and Leander class frigates.
The Kashin II class destroyers provide the best AAW defense for
the Indian fleet. The SA-N-1 system (17 nm range) provides the nearest thing
to an area air defense capability that the Indian Navy possesses. Although
lacking the ability to engage sea-skimming missiles, the SA-N-1 could be
effective against maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), helicopters, or non-standoff
tactical aviation assets that come within range. Of additional importance in
the CV escort role are the ASW capabilities of the Kashin II destroyers. Hull-
mounted and variable-depth sonar (VDS) systems, along with either a KA-25
Hormone or KA-28 Helix ASW helicopter, give these ships a respectable
submarine detection and engagement capability (Sharpe, 1990, p. 265).
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The three Godavari class frigates provide the Indian CV with
somewhat less AAW but slightly better ASW protection than the Kashin II
destroyers. The primary AAW defense, the SA-N-4, provides adequate point-
defense capability for the frigates themselves, but provides no significant
AAW protection for the CVs. The strength of the Godavari class is the ASW
suite. Modern hull-mounted and VDS systems provide excellent submarine
detection and tracking capability. Additionally, this class embarks two
helicopters (usually Sea Kings with dipping sonars) that allow standoff
detection and attack of hostile submarines (Sharpe, 1990, p. 267).
The Leander class frigates are the last group of current Indian
ships that are legitimate contenders to be included in the CV escort force.
Although the Dutch air search radar carried by the Leanders allows detection
at ranges out to 145 nautical miles, the SEACAT missile system is only useful
for point-defense. The ASW capabilities of these vessels consist of hull-
mounted and VDS systems, as well as one Sea King ASW helicopter for
standoff prosecution (Sharpe, 1990, p 267).
The Indian CVBG, although lacking the capability of a U.S. battle
group, should be viewed as a capable force. Sea Harriers and Sea Kings
employing standoff weapons, along with the SSM capability of the escorts
(Kashin II, Godavari and Leander units all field SS-N-2B or C variants with a
range of 25 or 45 nautical miles respectively) could potentially interdict
maritime and naval assets transiting regional chokepoints, such as the
Malacca Straits, or on the open ocean. This strike capability will be enhanced
with the addition of a third Indian carrier in the mid-1990s. The ASW
capabilities of the escorts, along with numerous ASW helicopters operated
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from the carriers, would complicate the task for a submarine attempting to
close the battle group, especially if the approach route were dictated by
regional geography. The AAW systems, primarily the SA-N-1 and Sea
Harriers in CAP roles, although second-rate by U.S. standards, would require
tactical aircraft to utilize standoff weapons such as HARPOON or EXOCET,
rather than cheaper and more numerous "dumb bombs" in any attack on the
carriers. The numerous point-defense missile and gun systems of the Indian
CVBG would require that significant amounts of ordnance be expended to
ensure defense saturation and at least "mission kills" of the Indian ships.
This could have serious logistical implications in a "come as you are"
regional conflict.
b. SAG Threat
The Indian surface combatants that are not utilized as CV escorts
are capable of presenting a serious threat to naval forces by deploying in
SAGs. The naval facilities on both Indian coasts, as well as island bases, allow
the majority of surface combatants to operate within unrefuelled range of the
Malaccan Straits, Straits of Hormuz, and approaches from Diego Garcia. In
addition to the combatants mentioned previously, the Whitby and Petya II
class frigates, as well as the Tarantul, Khukri, Pauk II and Nanuchka class
corvettes are the forces that would likely comprise an Indian SAG.
The two Whitby class frigates, although over 30 years old, were
modernized in the early 1980s with the addition of three SS-N-2A SSMs to
present a respectable ASUW threat. Secondary ASUW and limited AAW
capability is provided by four 30 mm guns. Additionally, these vessels
employ a hull-mounted sonar in conjunction with a Chetak helicopter for
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ASW defense. The Whitby class would be most dangerous to assets if they
deployed with AAW-capable ships or under the protection of land-based air.
The six remaining Petya II class frigates, like the Pauk II class,
present an ASUW threat primarily to merchant shipping. Four 76mm guns
and ASUW torpedoes that this class carries pose a credible maritime
interdiction threat. This class, however, would not be a serious threat to
warships.
The six Tarantul class corvettes are modern warships with
excellent ASUW capabilities. Four SS-N-2C SSMs and a 76mm gun,
combined with high speed, make these vessels ideal platforms for chokepoint
interdiction. The Tarantul class, however, lacks any significant AAW or
ASW capability and are vulnerable to air or submarine attack. Additionally,
as a result of small displacement and limited endurance, this class is likely to
be confined to operations in the Bay of Bengal, where sea states are usually
lower and logistic support is 'available from coastal facilities or from Port
Blair. The primary threat of this class would be to maritime traffic or
unalerted warships transiting the Malacca Straits on the Bay of Bengal SLOCs.
The four Khukri class corvettes (with three building) are Indian-
designed vessels with a primary mission of ASW. The ASUW capability of
this class consists of four SS-N-2C SSMs and a 76mm gun. An operational
radius of 2000 nautical miles allows the Khukris to be employed at all
regional chokepoints or on the open ocean. With only a point-defense SAM
system, however, this class is vulnerable to air and surface missile attacks.
The four Pauk II class corvettes are essentially only an ASUW
threat to merchant shipping passing close to the Indian coast or near bases
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such as those in the Andamans and Laccadives. The one 76mm gun is
adequate for engaging unarmed vessels but is of little utility in an
engagement with opposing warships. Although possessing an elementary
VDS system, the ASW armament of torpedoes and RBU-1200 mortars is
unlikely to pose a serious threat to any attacking submarine. As with most
Indian surface combatants, AAW armament is lacking and this class
represents little threat to U.S. naval forces.
The three Soviet-built Nanuchka II class corvettes are dedicated
ASUW platforms with a primary armament of four SS-N-2B SSMs. The light
displacement of these vessels and a relatively short operating range suggest
that they would be best employed against vessels in the Bay of Bengal or
transiting the Malacca Straits. The Nanuchka class, having no ASW
capability, are totally vulnerable to submarine attack, and the SA-N-4 AAW
system provides only point-defense protection from standoff attack by
opposing air assets.
Assuming that one-third of these surface combatants are
available at any one time, and that the destroyers, as well as Godavari and
Leander class frigates, are allocated for CV escort duties, the likely
composition of Indian SAGs can be postulated. A SAG operating from
Vishakhapatnam or Port Blair to interdict traffic in the Bay of Bengal on the
Malacca Straits might consist of:
• 2 Tarantul
• 2 Pauk II
• 1 Nanuchka
• 2 Petya II
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A SAG of this composition would have the capability of conducting
significant ASUW activity against opposing assets. A minimal strike
capability of 12 SSMs, as well as significant gun assets, could cause serious
damage to merchant vessels or unalerted naval forces. This SAG would,
however, be entirely dependent on land-based air (assuming that the Sea
Harriers are not in the vicinity) for AAW protection and could be successfully
neutralized by air strikes.
A SAG operating from Bombay or Cochin to interdict the Arabian
Sea or southern approaches would likely be limited due to the heavier sea
states in that area, as well as the range from Indian ports to the following:
• 2 Khukri
• 1 Whitby
A SAG of this composition could launch up to eleven SSMs and would have
a respectable ASW capability. It would, however, be vulnerable to air and
surface strikes. These projected SAG compositions are definitely "worst-case
scenarios" from an Indian readiness point of view. The ASUW, ASW and
AAW capabilities of these groups would be greatly increased if more than
one-third of the vessels were operationally available at the time and the
destroyers were not all engaged in CV escort duties. The continued
development at island bases will allow more flexible positioning of these
SAGs and present the operational commanders with more tactical options.
The striking power of these SAGs will also increase as additional Khukri and
Tarantul class corvettes, as well as the Project 15 destroyers become available
throughout the 1990s. Additionally the Indian Navy's force of 12 OSA I and
OSA II missile boats, although not addressed in this study, could strike
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maritime targets passing within 400 nautical miles of the Indian coast. It is
apparent, however, that the small displacement of many of the frigates and
corvettes preclude their use in the Arabian Sea or Indian Ocean, especially
during the monsoon season. The primary threat posed by an Indian SAG is
not a "fleet vs. fleet" engagement, but rather separate ASUW strikes at
merchant and isolated naval assets such as CLF shuttle ships. Although not
as sophisticated or as capable as, say, a U.S. or Soviet SAG, these forces, aided
to a large degree by regional geography, have the capability to inflict serious
casualties in a future conflict, particularly if they are dismissed as being part of
just another "Third World" navy.
c. Amphibious Potential Threat
The amphibious forces of the Indian Navy are the least capable
assets of India's surface force. The present force of two Magar class LSTs, nine
Polnochny class LSMs and seven Vasco da Gama class LCUs are essentially
capable of only unopposed operations within 100 nautical miles of their bases.
The lack of NGFS capability and sufficient numbers of amphibious-trained
personnel seriously limits the threat that this force could pose. The most
likely danger would be to merchant vessels or foreign nationals that were
located in a regional nation (i.e. Sri Lanka) at the time of an Indian
amphibious operation. The amphibious capability of the Indian surface force
will continue to develop, however, as additional assets are added in the next
few years.
2. Capabilities of Indian Surface Fleet in an Allied Role
Given the relatively unlikely prospect for an Indo-U.S. conflict, the
developing Indian surface force may be of more interest to U.S. planners as a
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potential ally than as an adversary. Although serious political obstacles
would have to be overcome, primarily tensions between India and the PRC or
Pakistan, a naval security arrangement involving U.S., India and the PRC or
other regional nations could have beneficial results for all concerned. Then
Indian Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Nadkarni admitted in 1991 that India
may have to enter into regional security arrangements in order to meet its
security requirements—a sentiment echoed by his successor (Nadkarni, 1991,
p. 44). Although such an arrangement is envisioned with only regional
nations, India could possibly be convinced that the U.S. could contribute to
regional security. In addition to enhanced regional security, the benefits to





In an era of declining U.S. naval forces, a collective naval security
arrangement might enable the warships of India and other littoral nations to
replace to a degree, U.S. assets that will not be available. Combined naval
exercises and operations with regional nations will, as suggested by SECNAV,
CNO and CMC, allow the U.S. Navy to "... facilitate cooperation and
coordination with them and to maintain our own expertise in likely
operating environments." (Garrett, 1991, p. 39)
Combined operations with Indian CVBGs, SAGs and amphibious
forces might provide several advantages to U.S. forces in the region. First,
operations with the Indian carriers would assist the U.S. in evaluating the
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performance of naval V/STOL aircraft in roles other than close-air support
(i.e., CAP, ASUW). This should facilitate the development of tactics to
counter these aircraft, as well as promote the evolution and possibly
expanded use of V/STOL aircraft in the U.S. Navy. Second, ASW exercises
and operations with Indian surface vessels would allow the U.S. to benefit
from extensive Indian experience in ASW operations against the diesel
submarine threat in shallow water—an area of ASW in which the U.S. Navy
acquires little routine exposure. Third, operations with Indian amphibious
forces might give U.S. planners added options when dealing with regional
crises. An example might be a regional coup scenario requiring rapid
evacuation of U.S. citizens, in which Indian forces could be used if a U.S.
ARG were not in close proximity. Fourth, agreements with India could
provide the U.S. Navy with access to regional training ranges and operating
areas, facilitating improved training of U.S forces in the region. Finally,
combined operations and exercises with the Indian navy, as well as other
littoral navies, could facilitate a spirit of trust and cooperation between the
U.S. and India and among the regional nations. The opportunity to observe
regional naval activities could reduce uncertainty in the region and increase
the chances for peaceful coexistence if a suitable basis for cooperation were
found.
b. Logistic Support
In the event of a U.S. /Indian naval security agreement, Indian
logistic support could potentially become accessible to U.S. naval forces
operating in the Indian Ocean region. The facilities of naval bases in Bombay,
Cochin and Vishakhapatnam, along with port facilities in Goa, Calcutta and
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Karwar, could provide mid-deployment support to U.S. forces in a manner
similar to support provided by similar overseas facilities. Political overtones
notwithstanding, this support could provide U.S. commanders with greater
flexibility when planning battle group replenishments and ease the burden
on the always overtaxed U.S. logistics assets.
c. Naval Presence
The last major advantage that a U.S. /Indian naval agreement
would give the U.S. is one of enhanced naval presence. The sight of an
Indian carrier accompanied by U.S. and other regional escorts in a combined
task force could serve to soothe regional anxieties over the intent of India's
naval expansion. Even the perception of Pakistani and Indian naval forces
operating together with U.S. forces (as "adult supervision") might result in a
lessening of regional tensions and an increased level of mutual trust—factors
that would serve the U.S. desire for security and stability in the region, if
properly addressed with the PRC.
d. Advantages for India
The Indian Navy stands to gain as much, if not more, than the
U.S. Navy from a regional security arrangement. During a period when some
Indian politicians have complained that there is "... just no money for the
ambitious plans of the armed forces in general" (Gupta, 1989, p. 42), such an
arrangement could contribute to addressing India's security concerns and
need for naval presence without requiring additional large monetary
expenditures. Given the fact that the Indian Navy's desire that extra-regional
powers vacate the Indian Ocean is unlikely to be realized, a security
arrangement between the U.S. and India would allow the Indian Navy to
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monitor U.S. activity and provide reassurance as to the non-aggressive intent
of U.S. policy, while providing a suitable counterbalance to a perceived PRC
desire to exert regional influence. The Indian Navy would also gain insight
into carrier battle group operations and other aspects of how larger navies
function. Closer relations with the U.S. Navy could also result in the Indian
acquisition of U.S. naval technologies (such as the GE LM2500 gas turbines
currently being license-built for the PROJECT 15 destroyers). Finally,
revenues from logistical support of U.S. naval forces might be welcomed in
light of India's current financial problems that have resulted in a decline in
operations and maintenance funds for the Indian Navy (Gupta, 1989, p. 43).
3. Recommendations
The following are recommendations for U.S. policy makers to make
best use of the capabilities of the Indian Navy in general and the surface force
in particular:
• Convene a strategy conference and examine options to enhance
regional security through the use of naval forces.
• Continue military and diplomatic support to Pakistan to allay potential
fears of abandonment resulting from closer U.S.-Indian relations.
• Initiate a US-PRC dialogue to show that U.S.-India cooperation is a
sound approach to enhanced regional stability.
• Encourage India to present an official position paper clearly defining
the intent of the current naval expansion. This would do much to
allay regional fears and to develop a basis for U.S.-Indian, as well as
regional, naval cooperation (Conboy, 1990, p. 4).
• Continue meetings between Indian and U.S. military experts such as
those held as the U.S. National Defense University in 1989 (Conboy,
1990, p. 11).
• Suggest an enhanced port visit program of U.S. ships to Indian ports
and invite reciprocal visits by the Indian Navy.
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• Convene meetings between regional naval and diplomatic leadership
to discuss the roles that could be played by a regional naval force
similar to, although not necessarily as structured as,
STANAVFORLANT.
• Invite the Indian Navy to operate one or two vessels with U.S. forces as
a preliminary gesture of goodwill and cooperation.
• Suggest the possibility of increased U.S. technical cooperation with the
Indian Navy in exchange for occasional use of Indian facilities.
Although these recommendations are only starting points and are
sure to encounter significant political difficulties, they could, if implemented,
go a long way towards establishing an atmosphere of trust and openness
between the U.S., India and other Indian Ocean littoral nations. Over time, it
could lead to combined naval force operations in some scenarios. The
creation of a more stable Indian Ocean region will take time and trust, but
will not occur unless preliminary steps are taken. Closer ties between India
and the U.S. developed simultaneously with improved relations between the
U.S. and China could also serve to prevent future Sino-Indian conflicts and
contribute to U.S. goals of stability in the Indian Ocean region as well as the
western Pacific. The potential benefits of improved relationships between the
U.S. and India are significant and well worth the diplomatic initiative
required. Rapprochement between India and China, considered by India to be
its major threat, will be a difficult diplomatic accomplishment. A regional
security agreement between the U.S. and India, however, along with
improved Sino-U.S. relations, could place the U.S. in the position of "middle
man" and potentially allow the U.S. to play a major role in the pursuit of
regional security.
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Both the U.S. and Indian navies are currently facing some similar
problems. Budgetary pressures, political assault about the lack of a "real"
enemy and an uncertain future force structure, conflicting with a desire for
security and stability in a volatile world, make the planning process for the
U.S. and Indian naval leadership a difficult one. The U.S. is faced with the
choice of continuing the heretofore strained relationship with India, which
was primarily a result of U.S.-Pakistan, Indo-Soviet relationships and the PRC
factor, or actively moving to establish closer ties with India. It would
seemingly be to the advantage of the U.S. to attempt to develop closer
economic, cultural and military ties with India. An improved relationship
between the U.S. and India could foster regional stability and trust—especially
in regard to Indo-Pakistani and Indo-PRC tensions. Without some type of
regional forum, the developing naval competitions between India and other
regional actors (Pakistan, PRC, Indonesia, etc.) could become a self-fulfilling
avenue to full-scale conflict, loosely analogous to the Anglo-German naval
competition prior to World War I. For an improved relationship to occur,
however, India must be willing to reciprocate. That there is potentially hope
for the future was illustrated by Admiral Nadkarni when, in an October 1990
address to the U.S. Naval War College, he stated "... I dare say that you will
find that the interests of your country and those of mine, in the Indian Ocean
area, will increasingly coincide as the years go by" (Nadkarni, 1990, p. 7). The
Indian Ocean interest of the U.S. and of India will be better served if a spirit of
friendship and cooperation can be nurtured. Increased bilateral contacts
between the U.S. and Indian and the development of some shared interests
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with other regional navies could form the basis of a stabilizing and mutually
beneficial regional security relationship.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The continued development of the Indian surface fleet into a modern,
power projection force will have significant implications for U.S. Indian
Ocean policy. The strategic importance of the Indian Ocean region to the U.S.
dictates that the emergence of a relatively dominant regional naval force,
with unclear strategic aims, be viewed with watchful interest. The
developing power projection capabilities of the Indian surface fleet, combined
with the key geographic location of India and the lack of a concisely
articulated naval strategy, necessitate that the U.S. stay abreast of India's
growing naval potential.
The Indian surface fleet, evaluated in the context of Hill's model for
medium naval powers, has moderate to high capabilities in most aspects of
normal, low intensity and higher level operations. The Indian surface fleet's
capabilities in all areas will improve as new construction warships and
indigenous systems become operational.
The industrial support for the Indian surface fleet, such as shipyards,
national industry and R&D, is developing at a rapid pace and is already
fielding systems of high quality. The reliance of the Indian Navy on foreign
suppliers will steadily decrease as industrial developments continue and,
except in some weapons categories, will provide the Indian fleet with a high
degree of self-sufficiency by the end of the decade.
The Indian surface force is already superior in numbers and
sophistication to other regional navies. It is the only littoral naval force that
has a carrier strike capability. Current weak areas of logistic support and
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vulnerability to air attack are steadily being rectified. By the end of the decade,
the majority of the Indian surface force deficiencies will have been corrected
to a large degree.
The current Indian naval strategy, although not officially articulated,
emphasizes EEZ security, monitoring of extra-regional navies, sea control in
specified areas, and limited power projection. This emphasis will continue in
the future, although there are many indications, such as organic AEW
development, logistics force expansion, enhanced amphibious capability and
the possible acquisition of a conventional aircraft carrier, that suggest a more
proactive, offensive future naval posture. These developments, supported by
rhetoric from naval and political sources, suggest that the Indian Navy sees
itself playing a larger regional role in the future.
Regional reactions to India's naval developments have been an almost
universall chorus of concern and apprehension. Many littoral nations have
begun to bolster their own naval forces to counter India's naval expansion .
There is some danger that a self-fulfilling regional naval arms race, roughly
analogous to the Anglo-German arms competition prior to World War I,
could lead eventually to a naval conflict.
The Indian naval developments could have implications for U.S.
regional policy. While the Indian surface force is capable of putting U.S. and
friendly maritime interests at risk, it is of potentially greater significance as a
regional asset to the U.S. Military and diplomatic initiatives between the U.S.
and India could result in a naval security arrangement that could satisfy the
two countries mutual goals of regional stability and security. Improved
relations with India simultaneous to closer Sino-U.S. cooperation, could
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allow the U.S. to play a major reassurance role in promoting stability in the
Indian Ocean and western Pacific regions.
The developing naval power of the Indian surface force cannot be ignored
by U.S. policy makers. The nature of the future relationship between the U.S.
Navy and the Indian Navy will depend on the relationship between the two
governments. The Indian naval expansion is indicative of an emerging sense
of national identity and importance—a sentiment becoming more common
in many Third World nations. While maintaining prudent planning hedges
against unhappier alternatives, the U.S. should exert every effort to
understand and communicate with India. If a fraction of the diplomatic effort
heretofore applied to the Soviet Union were applied to India, there is every
reason to hope that the U.S. could achieve a beneficial relationship with the
dominant power in the Indian Ocean.
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APPENDIX A. INDIAN SHIPBORNE AIRCRAFT
Source: (Sharpe, 1991, p. 269)














Fleet air defense/strike/reconnaissance/future ASUW role
Ferranti Blue Fox air intercept radar; limited ECM
2 Magic Matra AAM
2 30 mm Aden cannon
2 Sea Eagle ASM
3.6 tons of "iron bombs"
300 (Goa)
NOTE: Mid-life update planned after 1995





ROLE: ASW for lage escorts and CVs
SENSORS: MEL search radar
ALCATEL dipping sonar
WEAPONS: 4 ASW torpedoes
BAe Mkll depth bombs or mines
SQUADRON: 330 (Cochin)
336 (Cochin)
3. WESTLAND SEA KING MKS 42/42B/Q











ASW: 4 torpedoes, depth bombs or mines (Mk 42B only)
ASUW: 2 Sea Eagle ASM
(Mk 42B only)
Mk 42B ASUW
Mk 42C Assault /Vertrep
Mk 42D AEW
Mk 42B—MEL search radar
Thomson Sinatra H/S-112
ESM equipment
Mk 42C—Bendix weather radar
Mk 42D—Thorn EMI search radar
Racal MIR-2 radar
Total of up to 15 Mk 42D planned














Some equipped with search radar
ASW—2 torpedoes
321 (Goa); 331 (Cochin)
















ASW-2 torpedoes or 4 depth bombs
333 (Goa)










WEAPONS: ASW—2 torpedoes or 4 depth bombs
NOTE: Total of 18 ordered to replace Ka-25.
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APPENDIX B. INDIAN SURFACE COMBATANT AND SUPPORT FORCES








































































APPENDIX C MAJOR INDIAN NAVAL BASES AND ESTABLISHMENTS
INS India Naval Headquarters (New Delhi)
Commander-in-Chief, Western Command HQ and Dockyard (Bombay)
Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Command HQ and Dockyard (Vishakhapatnam)
Commander-in-Chief, Southern Command HQ and naval training; ship repair yard
(Cochin)
Flag Officer, Naval Aviation




Planned carrier case (Karwar)
(Port Blair, Andaman Island)
Destoyers, frigates, corvettes (Bombay);
Frigates, corvettes, LSTs, auxiliaries
(Calcutta);
Patrol craft, LCU (Goa)
Patrol craft (Vishakhapatnam)
NOTE: Additional facilities located in Nicobar and Laccadive island groups.
Source: (Sharpe, 1990, p. 260)
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APPENDIX D. INDIAN NAVAL ORGANIZATION





































































SOURCE: (Jacobs, 1986, p. 122) and (Singh, 1987, p. 18)
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APPENDIX E. MAJOR INDIAN DEFENSE R&D ESTABLISHMENTS AND
LABORATORIES
AERONAUTICS
Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE)
Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE)
Aerial Delivery R&D Establishment (ADRDE)
ELECTRONICS
Electronics & Radar Development Establishment (LRDE)
Defence Electronics Research Laboratory (DLRL)
Defence Electronics Applications Laboratory (DEAL)
Instruments R&D Laboratory (IRDL)
Defence Science Centre (DSC)
Solid-State Physics Laboratory (SPL)
Microwave Tube Research and Development Centre (MTRDC)
WEAPON SYSTEMS
Defence R&D Laboratory (DRDL)
Combat Vehicle R&D Establishment (CVRDE)
Armament R&D Establishment (ARDE)
Explosive R&D Establishment (ERDL)
Proof & Experimental Establishment (PEE)
Terminal Ballistics Research Laboratory (TBRL)
131
NAVAL TECHNOLOGY
Naval Physical & Oceanography Laboratory (NPOL)
Naval Chemical & Metallurgical Laboratory (NCML)
Naval Science & Technological Laboratory (NSTL)
ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT
Defence Terrain Research Laboratory (DTRL)
R&D Establishment (Engineers) (RDEE)
Vehicle R&D Establishment (VRDE)
Snow & Avalanche Study Establishment (SASE)
Defence Institute of Fire Research (DIFR)
MATERIALS
Defence Metallurgical Research Laboratory (DMRL)
Defence Materials and Stores R&D Establishment (DMSRDE)
LIFE SCIENCES
Institute of Nuclear Medicine & Applied Sciences (INMAS)
Defence Bio-Engineering and Electromedical Laboratory (DEBEL)
Defence Institute of Physiology & Allied Sciences (DIPAS)
Defence Institute of Psychological Research (DIPR)
Defence R&D Establishment (DRDE)
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, TRAINING & INFORMATION
Centre for Aeronautical Systems, Studies & Analyses (CASSA)
Institute for Systems Studies and Analyses (ISSA)
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Defence Institute of Works Study (DIWS)
Institute of Armament Technology (IAT)
Defence Scientific Information & Documentation Center (DESIDOC)
SOURCE: (Howarth, 1986, p. 437)
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APPENDIX F. PRINCIPAL INDIAN DEFENSE MANUFACTURERS
AEROSPACE
Bharat Electronics Ltd., (BEL)
Carbon Composites Ltd.
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL)—Several locations and subdivisions
ORDNANCE

















Mahindra & Mahindra, Ltd.
MILITARY SUPPORT SYSTEMS
Bharat Earth Movers Limited
Mishra Dhatu Nigam Limited (MIDHANI)
Praga Tools Limited
NAVAL HULL CONSTRUCTION
Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers Ltd. (GRSE)
Goa Shipyards Limited (GSL)
Hindustan Shipyard
Mazagon Dock, Ltd. (MDL)
NAVAL SHIP SYSTEMS COMPONENTS
Bharat Dynamics Ltd.
Bharat Electronics Ltd., (BEL)













SOURCE: (Prakash, 1990, p. 38-39.)
136
REFERENCES
"APDR-Newsletter," Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, v. XVII, n. 8, 1991.
"APDR-Newsletter," Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, v. XVII, n. 10, April 1991.
"APDR-Newsletter," Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, v. XVII, n. 12, June 1991.
"Columnist Sees Control of Indian Ocean as India's Destiny," JPRS Report
JPRS-NEA-89-014, 1989.
"Defense Official Says U.S. Presence 'Vital'," Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, 13 March 1990.
"Intelligence Chief Interviewed on Threat," Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, 22 February 1990.
"Naval Missile Display," JPRS Report JPRS-NEA-91-015, 1991.
"The Finest of Living Naval Traditions," Sainik Samachar, v. 37, n. 7, 1990.
Agashe, V., "Maritime Strategy and Future Naval Warfare," Sainik
Samachar, v. 37, n. 48-49, 1990.
Awati, M., "An Indian Perspective of Australia's Maritime Interests with
Particular Reference to Australia's Role in Indian Ocean Affairs," Australia's
Maritime Interests: Views from Overseas, W. Bateman & M. Ward, ed.,
Australian Centre for Maritime Studies, 1990.
Awati, M., "Emerging Security Issues in the Indian Ocean: An Indian
Perspective," Superpower Rivalry in the Indian Ocean: Indian and American
Perspectives, S. Harrison and K. Subrahmanyam, ed., Oxford University press,
1989.
Barrie, P., "YAK Re-forged," Flight International, v. 140, n. 4272, 1991.
Behm, A. J. and Soedibyo, "Strategic Cohesion and the Security of Southeast
Asia and the South Pacific," Australia's Maritime Interests: Views from
Overseas, W. Bateman & M. Ward, ed., Australian Centre for Maritime
Studies, 1990.
137
Birla Institute of Scientific Research, Naval Aviation: A World History,
Allied Publishers Private (New Delhi), 1985.
Cheung, T., "Build-up Backlash," Far Eastern Economic Review, v. 145, n. 30,
1989.
Clad, J., "Power and Poverty," Far Eastern Economic Review, v. 149, n. 23,
1990.
Conboy, K., "A Guide to U.S.-South Asian Relations," Asian Studies Center
Backgrounder, n. 81, The Heritage Foundation, 1988.
Conboy, K., "Opportunities for American in a Changing India," Asian Studies
Center Backgrounder, n. 103, The Heritage Foundation, 1990.
Cook, N., "Soviets Offer YAK-141 to India," Jane's Defence Weekly, v. 15, n.
26,1991.
Garrett, H. L., "The Way Ahead," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 116, n.
4, 1991.
Government of India Ministry of Defence Annual Report 1985-86.
Government of Indian Ministry of Defence Annual Report 1988-89.
Grant, N. B., "Navy's Blue-Water Obsession," United Services Institute
Journal, v. 119, 1989.
Grazebrook, A. W., "The Indian Ocean's Naval Giant," Jane's Naval Review,
Jane's Publishing Company, 1987.
Gupta, S., "Heading for a Crisis," India Today, v. XIV, n. 4, 1989.
Hahn, B., "Sea Lanes Becoming more Vulnerable, more Important," Asia-
Pacific Defence Reporter, v. XVII, n. 3, 1990.
Hamilton, I., "Australians to Help Plan New Indian Naval Base," Pacific
Defence Reporter, v. XV, n. 11, 1989.
Harrison, S., "India, the United States and Superpower Rivalry in the Indian
Ocean," Superpower Rivalry in the Indian Ocean: Indian and American
Perspectives, S. Harrison and K. Subrahmanyam, ed., Oxford University Press,
1989.
Hill, J. R., Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers, Naval Institute Press, 1986.
138
Howarth, M., "India: Indigenous Programs Flourish Amid Defense
Modernization," International Defence Review, v. 19, n. 4, 1986.
Hussain, H., "An Exclusive Interview with Malaysia's Defence Minister,"
Asian Defence Journal, n. 11, 1990.
Indian Military Yearbook (1986-87), Guide Publications, 1987.
Indian Military Yearbook (1987-88), Guide Publications, 1988.
Jacobs, G., "India's Changing Naval Forces," Navy International, v. 38, n. 17,
1991.
Jones, R., "India: Defense Policy, Modern Weapons, and Regional Power,"
Emerging Powers: Defense and Security in the Third World, Praeger
Publishing, 1986.
Kassim, A., "New Delhi Wants Use of Hanoi Naval Facilities," Asian Defence
Journal, n. 9, September 1990.
Kaul, R., "The Indo-Pakistani War and the Changing Balance of Power in the
Indian Ocean," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 99, n. 843, 1973.
Kohli, S., Sea Power and the Indian Navy, McGraw-Hill Publishing, 1978.
Kulkarni, S. "The Indian Marine Special Force," Sainik Samachar, v. 38, n. 15,
1991.
Larus, J., "India: The Neglected Service Faces the Future," U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, v. 107, n. 937, 1981.
Lenton, H., "Review of World Naval Construction," Navy International, v.
96, n. 6, 1991.
Mama, H., "INS Khukri: A Powerful New Class of Corvette," International
Defence Review, v. 22, n. 12, 1989.
McDonald, H., "Singh's Bed of Nails," Far Eastern Economic Review, v. 153,
n. 20, 1991.
Mukherjee, S., "India Sets Date for New Aircraft Carrier," Jane's Defence
Weekly, v. 1, n. 23, 1989.
Nadkarni, J., "More Details on Interview," JPRS Report JPRS-NEA-89-008,
1989.
139
Nadkarni, J., "Naval Chief on Regional Security Arrangements/' Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, 19 March 1991.
Nadkarni, J., "Retiring Admiral Comments on Navy Needs, Strength," JPRS
Report JPRS-NEA-91-010, 1991.
Nadkarni, J., unpublished speech to U.S. Naval War College, October 1990.
Nugent, N., "The Defence Preparedness of India: Arming for Tomorrow,"
Military Technology, v. XV, n. 3, 1991.
Prakash, A., "A Carrier Force for the Indian Navy," Naval War College
Review, v. XLIII, n. 4, 1990.
Prakash, S., "India's Military Success in the Maldives," Defense & Foreign
Affairs, n. 12, 1988.
Prakash, S., "Indian Defense: A Conscious Attempt at Pragmatism," Defense
& Foreign Affairs, v. XVIII, n. 4, 1990.
Preston, A., "Naval Construction 1990," Naval Forces, v. XII, n. 2, 1991.
Preston, A., "The Changing Face of the PLA Navy," Asian Defence Journal, n.
8, 1989.
Prezelin, B., The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World
(1990/91), Naval Institute Press, 1990.
Rackham, P., Jane's C3I Systems 1990-91, Jane's Information Group, 1990.
Raghunathan, S., "India's Move towards Defense Self-Reliance and the New
Search for Defense Exports," Defense & Foreign Affairs, v. XVIII, n. 4, 1990.
Rais, R. B., "Regional Response to Superpower Naval Presence in the Indian
Ocean," Naval Forces, v. XI, n. 5, 1990.
Rikhye, R., "The Real Indian Navy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 116,
n. 3, February 1990.
Roy, M. "Asymmetry of India's Defence Force: A Sailor's View," Strategic
Analysis, v. XIII, n. 3, 1990.
Roy, M., "The Indian Navy from the Bridge," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, v. 116, n. 3, March 1990.
140
Samaddar, S., "Air Power at Sea/' Sainik Samachar, v. 38, n. 17, 1991.
Sassheen, R. S., "Naval Build-up Alarms Region," Asian Defence Journal, n.
5, 1988.
Seshan, T., "Stretching the Defense Rupee," Defense & Foreign Affairs, v.
XVI, n. 12, 1988.
Sharpe, R., ed. Jane's Fighting Ships (1991-92), Jane's Information Group, 1991.
Sharpe, R., ed., Jane's Fighting Ships (1990-1991), Jane's Information Group,
1990.
Singh, C., "The Formidable Western Naval Command," Sainik Samachar, v.
37, n. 5, 1990.
Singh, G., "The Indian Ocean and Regional Security," International Essays II,
National Defense University Press, 1987.
Singh, K. and Shankar, V., "Indian Navy: Its Role in the Future," Sainik
Samachar, v. 36, n. 48-49, 1989.
Singh, P., "Premier Comments on Strength, Quality of Navy," Foreign
Broadcast Information Service (Near East & South Asia), 18 April 1990.
Singh, P., "Sealand to Bear-Foxtrot," Air International, v. 40, n. 1, 1991.
Singh, P., "The Indian Navy: Modernisation and Strategy in the 80s," Asian
Defence Journal, n. 7, 1987.
Singh, S., "The Indian Navy is No Threat," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
v. 117, n. 3, 1991.
S1PRI Yearbook 1990, Oxford University Press, 1990.
Sojka, G., 'The Missions of the Indian Navy," Naval War College Review, v.
XXXVI, n. 1, 1983.
Subrahmanyam, K., "An Indian Perspective on International Security," Asian
Perspectives on International Security, St. Martin's Press, 1984.
Subrahmanyam, K., "Naval Security Doctrine for India," Strategic Analysis, v.
XII, n. 11,1990.
141
Tahliani, R., "Maritime Strategy/' United Services Institute of India Journal,
v. Ill, 1981.
Telephone conversation between Ashley J. Tellis and the author, 02 June
1991.
Telephone conversation between Ashley J. Tellis and the author, 11
September 1991.
Telephone conversation between Ashley J. Tellis, Indian naval scholar, and
the author, 13 August 1991.
Telephone conversation between U.S. Department of Energy Information
Center and the author, 31 May 1991.
Tellis, A., "Securing the Barrack: The Logic, Structure and Objectives of
India's Naval Expansion, Part I," Naval War College Review, v. XLII, no. 3,
1990.
Tellis, A., "Securing the Barrack: The Logic, Structure and Objectives of
India's Naval Expansion, Part II," Naval War College Review, v. XLIII, no. 4,
1990.
Thakur, R., "India as a Regional Seapower," Asian Defence Journal, n. 5, 1990.
Thomas, R., "Strategies of Recipient Autonomy: The Case of India," Pacific &
World Studies #3, Westview Press, 1989.
Thomas, R., Indian Security Policy, Princeton University Press, 1986.
Todd, D., "Indian Shipbuilding Enters the Big League," International Defence
Review, v. 24, n. 3, 1991.
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures
and Arms Transfers (1989), 1990.
Vlahos, M., "India and China: Comparing Two Developing Powers Out
Twenty Years," Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs Bulletin, n. 3, 1988.
Wulf, H., "India: the Unfufilled Quest for Self-Sufficiency," Arms Production




1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5002
3. OP-60, The Pentagon, Room 4E556 1
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, DC 20350
4. OP-092, The Pentagon, Room 5C464 1
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, DC 20350
5. OP-61, The Pentagon, Room 4E572 1
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, DC 20350
6. Defense Intelligence Agency 1
Directorate of Science and Technology
ATTN: Dr. Jeff Fenton
Washington, DC 20340-6168
7. Defense Intelligence Agency 1
Directorate of Estimates (DB-2)
ATTN: LT Dave Caulfield, USN
Washington, DC 20340-0001






9. Dr. Donald C. Daniel
Director, Strategy and Campaign Department
CNWS, Naval War College
Newport, RI 02841





11. Commodore Sam Bateman, RAN
Department of Defence
P. O. Box E33
Queen Victoria Terrace
Canberra, AUSTRALIA 2600
12. CDR R. Mitchell Brown III, USN




13. LT Evan R. Pilling, USN
P. O. Box 265










Ct \ Indian surface comba-





c.l Indian surface comba-
tants : sea power for the
1990s.
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
3 2768 00032011 3
